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MAINTAINING SYSTEMIC INTEGRITY IN 
CAPITAL CASES: THE USE OF COURT-
APPOINTED COUNSEL TO PRESENT 
MITIGATING EVIDENCE WHEN THE 
DEFENDANT ADVOCATES DEATH 
LINDA E. CARTER* 
The defendant raped and then strangled a young woman. Charged 
with a capital offense, he has announced to his attorney and to the 
press that he wants to die. He pleads guilty to the capital offense. 
The time has come for the penalty phase-will he live or die? He 
refuses to agree to the introduction of any mitigating evidence on 
his behalf. Should death automatically be the penalty at the defen-
dant's request? Are there competing societal interests which require 
a determination of whether death is the only appropriate punishment 
for this defendant regardless of his choice? If so, who should present 
mitigating evidence against the defendant's wishes? 
This article focuses on the dilemma faced by the courts and by 
counsel when a defendant chooses not to introduce mitigating evi-
dence in a penalty proceeding deciding life or death. 1 The funda-
mental issue is whether the consideration of mitigating evidence at 
the trial-level penalty phase is required by the eighth amendment's 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment,2 regardless of the 
defendant's willingness to waive the amendment's protection. If 
mitigating circumstances must be introduced to avoid rendering the 
penalty unconstitutional for arbitrariness, the question of who should 
present the evidence then arises. Although the defense attorney would 
• Assistant Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of tl].e 
Pacific. B.A. 1974, University of Illinois; J.D. 1978, University of Utah. The author 
expresses appreciation to her colleagues at McGeorge who commented on drafts of 
this article and to her research assistant, Raymond L. Legg. 
1. Defendants can assert their acquiescence to the death penalty in several 
procedural postures. They can decline to pursue appeals or seek to waive a mandatory 
appeal. They can move to dismiss an appeal filed by an interested third party or to 
dismiss an appeal or petition for certiorari filed by the defendant's attorney without 
the defendant's permission. At the trial level, defendants can insist upon pleading 
guilty to a capital charge and then refuse to present mitigating evidence on the issue 
of penalty or permit a trial in the guilt phase and then refuse to introduce mitigating 
evidence when convicted. This article addresses the predicament of the courts and 
the attorneys at the penalty phase of trial. 
2. U.S. CoNST. amend. VIII: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 
95 
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appear the likely candidate, this approach raises ethical and consti-
tutional issues. The ethical question is whether defense counsel, who 
ordinarily presents mitigating evidence on behalf of the defendant, 
is bound by the standards of professional conduct3 to advocate 
zealously his client's request for death or whether counsel, as an 
"officer of the court," may proceed in opposition to his client's 
position. The constitutional issue is whether the defendant is denied 
his sixth amendment guarantee4 of effective assistance of counsel 
when counsel adheres to the defendant's goal and declines to intro-
duce mitigating evidence. Because the purpose of the guarantee of 
effective counsel is to ensure a fair trial, the question becomes 
whether a defendant is denied a fair trial due to counsel's failure to 
present mitigating evidence regardless of the defendant's wishes. The 
purpose of this article is to explore these complex, troublesome issues 
and to suggest a resolution. 
The article begins with an overview of a capital trial. Whether 
the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment requires the consideration of mitigating evidence is then 
discussed. The conclusion is reached that the presentation of miti-
gating evidence, not merely the opportunity to present it, is consti-
tutionally required. The article then explores the question of whether 
or not an individual defendant may waive the protection of the eighth 
amendment. After concluding that society's interest in the integrity 
of the process of imposing death outweighs an individual defendant's 
interest in free choice, the article then examines whether the defense 
attorney is the appropriate vehicle. This discussion encompasses both 
the standards of professional ethics and the sixth amendment's guar-
antee of effective assistance of counsel. After concluding it is not 
appropriate to require that the defense attorney present the mitigating 
evidence, the article's final section proposes a system for appointment 
by the court of an attorney whose role is the presentation of miti-
gating evidence in the situation where a defendant is advocating 
death. This proposal leaves the underlying attorney-client relationship 
between the defendant and defense counsel unscathed while, at the 
same time, preserving the fundamental constitutional guarantee of 
3. The standards used in this article are the American Bar Association's 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoN-
DUCT, AND THE STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE-THE DEFENSE FUNCTION. 
4. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shaJI have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
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non-arbitrary punishment through the consideration of mitigating 
evidence. 
l. THE CAPITAL CASE 
Thirty-seven states5 presently authorize imposition of the death 
penalty for certain heinous homicides.6 Bifurcated proceedings are 
usual in capital cases,7 a procedure approved by the United States 
Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia. 8 In the first part, often referred 
to as the guilt phase, the factfinder makes the typical determination 
of guilt or innocence. The second stage, the penalty phase, occurs 
only if there is a finding of guilt. It is during the penalty phase that 
the jury, or judge, makes the determination of life or death.9 Al-
though states differ in the precise language used in defining these 
phases, the general pattern for prescribing the parameters of each 
phase is discussed below. Although this article is primarily concerned 
with events in the penalty phase, an overview of both stages is helpful 
to understand fully the purposes of each proceeding. 
A. Guilt Phase 
The guilt phase operates in most respects as a typical criminal 
trial. The factfinder, judge or jury, determines the culpability of the 
5. States with a death penalty are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Tabak, Capital Punishment in the 
1980's, 1 Cal. Defender 4 (1986). 
6. See infra text accompanying note 16. 
7. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE§ 190.1 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 565.030(2) (Vernon 1986); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.07l(a) (Vernon 
Supp. 1986); Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REv. 305, 309. 
8. 428 u.s. 158 (1976). 
9. The defendant usually has a conditional right to waive the penalty phase 
jury. See, e.g., CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 16 and CAL. PENAL CoDE § 190.4(b) (West 
Supp. 1987) (defendant may waive penalty jury with consent of state where guilt 
determined by plea or by judge alone); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.006 (Vernon Supp. 
1986) (defendant may waive penalty phase jury after guilt phase of trial by jury or 
judge with agreement of state). Contra TEx. CRIM. PRoc. CoDE ANN. § 1.14 (Vernon 
Supp. 1986) (defendant may not waive jury trial in capital case). 
Often provisions allow the judge discretion to override the jury's decision. 
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(e) (West Supp. 1987) (judge must review the 
jury's verdict of death to determine "whether the jury's findings and verdicts that 
the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to 
law or the evidence presented."). A few states provide for an advisory jury only; 
the judge is the real decision-maker. See, e.g., FlA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)(3) 
(West 1985). 
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defendant. 10 Unless the defendant pleads guilty to an offense, the 
case proceeds to trial. The fact finder is not concerned with a penalty 
in this phase.'' The types of murder for which the death penalty can 
be imposed are usually Iimited.'2 However, two major modifications 
of a typical criminal trial can occur in the guilt phase of a capital 
case. 
The first exception to a typical trial is that the jury is "death-
qualified" in a capital case. 13 Although a voir dire of a jury panel 
is conducted in all criminal cases, the voir dire of the jury panel in 
a capital case includes extensive questioning of the jurors on their 
views about the death penalty. 14 Jurors who can never impose the 
death penalty are excludable on the theory that they cannot follow 
the law.'5 
The second modification in some states is the requirement of 
proof of a "special" or "aggravating" circumstance in addition to 
proof of the murder. The special circumstances typically include 
murder for pecuniary gain, murder while in custody, multiple mur-
ders, murders in connection with a serious felony, and especially 
heinous, atrocious or cruel murders.'6 Special circumstances elevate 
the homicide to capital murder. The proof of both the elements of 
10. See CAL. PENAL CoDE § 190.1 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 
565.030(2) (Vernon Supp. 1986). But see TEX. CRIM. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 1.14 
(Vernon Supp. 1986) (defendant cannot waive jury trial in capital case.). 
11. The factfinder determines guilt or innocence of the murder charge and, 
in some states, whether a special circumstance exists which elevates the homicide to 
a capital crime. See infra text accompanying notes 16-20. 
12. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE § 188 (West Supp. 1987) (explosives; poison; 
lying in wait; torture; willful , deliberate, and premeditated, felony-murder); Mo. 
ANN. STAT. § 565.020 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (deliberation required); TEx. PENAL 
CoDE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (peace officer as victim; felony murder; 
pecuniary gain; escaping; multiple murders). 
13. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE§ 1074(8) (West 1985) (a challenge for implied 
bias may be made where "the entertaining of such conscientious opinions as would 
preclude [the proposed juror from] finding the defendant guilty; in which case he 
must neither be permitted nor compelled to serve as a juror."); Mo. ANN STAT. § 
546.130 (Vernon 1983) (jurors "whose opinions are such as to preclude them from 
finding any defendant guilty of an offense punishable with death" are excluded); 
TEx. CRIM. PRoc. CoDE ANN. § 35.16(b)(l) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (permits challenge 
for cause of jurors with conscientious scruples regarding the death penalty). 
14. See Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in 
Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 325-28 (1983); Herron, Defending 
Life in Tennessee Death Penalty Cases, 51 TENN. L. REv. 681, 725 (1984). 
15. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968). The United States 
Supreme Court recently upheld the exclusion of jurors opposed to the death penalty 
despite arguments that eliminating these jurors creates a jury more likely to convict 
in the guilt phase. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). 
16. See, e.g. , CAL. PENAL CoDE § 190.2(14) (West Supp. 1987); TEx. PENAL 
CoDE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (Texas does not have a category of 
"atrocious" murders). 
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murder and special circumstances in these states is presented to the 
factfinder in the guilt phase. 17 The factfinder must find that the 
defendant is guilty of the murder alleged and must prove the existence 
of an aggravating circumstance in order to result in a capital con-
viction.18 Should the factfinder find the defendant guilty of the 
murder but not of the aggravating circumstance, the result is a 
murder conviction without the possibility of the death penalty. 19 The 
degree of the homicide to which the special circumstance is added is 
the highest in the statutory scheme. 20 Thus, manslaughter would not 
become a capital crime even if the terms of a special circumstance 
technically existed. Penalty proceedings are triggered only after a 
finding of both the required degree of homicide and the aggravating 
circumstances. 
B. The Penalty Phase 
The penalty phase is a separate proceeding conducted after the 
conclusion of the guilt phase. The defendant usually may choose 
whether the penalty shall be determined by a judge or a jury.21 This 
is true whether the defendant pled guilty, was tried by a jury or was 
tried by a judge in the guilt phase.22 If a jury tries the guilt phase 
17. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE § 190.4 (West Supp. 1987); TEx. CRIM. 
PRoc. CODE ANN. § 37.071(A) (Vernon Supp. 1986); TEx. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 
19.03 (Vernon Supp. 1986). In contrast, The American Law Institute proposed a 
system where the guilt phase would involve only a determination of guilt or innocence 
for murder. The aggravating circumstances would not be considered by the factfinder 
until the penalty phase. MoDEL PENAL CoDE § 210.6 (1980). For example, Mo. ANN. 
STAT. § 565.020 (Vernon Supp. 1986), which follows this scheme, defines first degree 
murder as "knowingly causes the death of another person after deliberation upon 
the matter" and imposes a penalty of death or life imprisonment without possibility 
of probation or parole (unless by act of governor). Thus, there is no finding of 
aggravating or special factors by the jury in the guilt phase. Death, however, cannot 
be imposed without a second penalty phase where the jury or judge considers 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Jd. at §§ 565.030, 565.032. 
18. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE § 190.1 (West Supp. 1987); TEx. PENAL 
CoDE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon Supp. 1986). 
19. For example, the maximum penalty for first degree murder in California 
without a "special circumstance" is twenty-five years to life. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 
190 (West Supp. 1987). In Missouri, the penalty for a first degree murder conviction 
without pursuing aggravating circumstances in the penalty phase (see supra note 
17) is imprisonment for life without possibility of probation or parole. Mo. ANN. 
STAT. § 565.020 (Vernon Supp. 1986). In Texas, the maximum sentence for murder 
without a special circumstance is not more than ninety-nine years nor less than five 
years. TEx. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 12.32(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987). 
20. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE § 190 (West 1987); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§ 19.03 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (special circumstances part of definition of "capital 
murder"). 
21. See supra note 9. 
22. Jd. 
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and the defendant elects to have the penalty determined by a jury, 
the same jury determines the penalty. 23 The penalty phase is conducted 
much like a trial. Both sides make opening statements, call witnesses, 
and introduce exhibits. The jury is instructed, if the jury is not 
waived, and closing arguments are made.24 The factfinder then delib-
erates to reach a decision of life or death. Death is to be imposed 
if the "aggravating factors" outweigh the "mitigating factors." 25 If 
the factfinder is a jury which cannot reach a unanimous verdict, life 
imprisonment is imposed as the penalty. 26 
State statutes generally define the factors to be considered in the 
penalty phase. Aggravating factors in this phase usually include the 
circumstances of the crime and any prior criminal history of the 
defendantY If not considered in the guilt phase, the aggravating 
factors will also include the "special circumstances" previously men-
tioned, such as double murders or felony murders.28 Mitigating factors 
23. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CooE § 190.3-4 (West Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. 
STAT. § 565 .030(2) (Vernon Supp. 1987); TEx. CRIM. PRoc. CoDE ANN. § 37.071(a) 
(Vernon.Supp. 1988). There are times, however, when a new jury might be impaneled. 
For instance, California provides that if the penalty phase jury cannot reach a 
unanimous verdict on the penalty, a new jury shall be impaneled to retry the penalty 
issue. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 190.4(b) (West Supp. 1988). A new jury may also be 
impaneled to retry only the penalty phase after reversal of the penalty on appeal. 
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.035(5)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1987). 
24. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030(4) (Vernon Supp. 1987). 
25. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CooE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 565.030(4) (Vernon Supp. 1987). A Missouri jury may also impose life imprison-
ment as the penalty if they do not find that an aggravating circumstance exists 
beyond a reasonable doubt; that the aggravating circumstance(s) warrant death; or 
if under all the circumstances they decide not to impose death. /d. The Texas scheme 
is different. Three questions are submitted to the jury. If all three are answered in 
the affirmative, death is to be imposed. If any one question is answered negatively, 
life imprisonment is to be imposed. TEx. CRIM. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon 
Supp. 1988). See infra note 53 and text accompanying notes 53-54. There is presently 
an undecided issue whether the burden of proof may rest on the defendant in this 
process and, whether imposed on the state or on the defendant, what the burden 
of proof should be. See, e.g., Gacey v. Illinois, 470 U.S. 1037, 1038 (1985), 
(Marshall, J ., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (unconstitutional to place burden 
on defendant to introduce mitigating evidence sufficient to overcome aggravating 
circumstance found by the jury); Teague v. Tennessee, 473 U.S. 911 (1985) (Marshall, 
J ., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (death penalty to be imposed if defendant 
failed to prove mitigating factors outweighed aggravating factors unconstitutional); 
White v. Maryland, 470 U.S. 1062 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari) (state should bear burden to prove death is the appropriate punishment). 
26. E.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE § 190.4(b) (West Supp. 1988) (after first hung 
jury, court is to impanel a second penalty jury; if second penalty jury cannot reach 
a decision, court may either impanel a third jury or impose life imprisonment 
without possibility of parole); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 565.030 (4)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1987) 
(life imprisonment imposed by court if jury cannot reach decision); TEx. CRIM. 
PRoc. CoDE ANN. § 37.071(e) (Vernon Supp. 1988) (life imprisonment). 
27. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1988). 
28. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032 (Vernon Supp. 1987). 
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are usually listed in the statute. 29 However, the defendant cannot be 
precluded from presenting evidence of unlisted mitigating factors. 30 
Whether statutorily prescribed or not, mitigating factors typically 
include the absence of prior criminal convictions, mental or emotional 
distress, the age of the defendant, prior positive contributions by the 
defendant to society, family ties and support, and, if applicable, a 
reduced capacity to appreciate the crime.31 
The most common procedure in the penalty phase is an eviden-
tiary proceeding, culminating with arguments by both counsel. 32 The 
state's evidence is usually limited in the penalty phase. 33 The state 
may have already introduced evidence of aggravating circumstances 
in the guilt phase.34 It is the defense which typically presents most 
of the evidence in the penalty phase. 35 The past life and character 
of the defendant are usually irrelevant in the guilt phase.36 While the 
state has often presented the evidence in the guilt phase that arguably 
makes the homicide especially heinous, the penalty phase is usually 
the defense's first opportunity to present to the factfinder the personal 
aspects of the defendant's life. 
If the defense fails to introduce mitigating evidence at this stage, 
the jury is left with little or no evidence of mitigation. Although 
there may be defenses raised at trial, such as intoxication or mental 
distress, which permit the introduction of evidence that could double 
as mitigating evidence in the penalty phase, the factfinder has already 
rejected these to a great degree in the guilt phase by finding the 
defendant guilty as charged. Moreover, it would be an unusual case 
where the defendant's family history and character were introduced 
in the guilt phase. Because aggravation includes the circumstances of 
the offense itself, it is a logical conclusion that aggravation outweighs 
29. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032 
(Vernon Supp. 1987). The Texas code does not specify circumstances except to the 
extent that the three questions posed to the penalty jury set forth specific factors 
to take into account. See infra note 53. However, mitigating factors are presented 
in this context. See infra text accompanying note 55. 
30. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Skipper v. South Carolina, 
476 u.s. 1 (1986). 
31. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 565.o32 (Vernon Supp. 1987). 
32. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030(4) (Vernon Supp. 1987); Goodpaster, 
supra note 14, at 334-38; Herron, supra note 14, at 732-63. 
33. See Goodpaster, supra note 14, at 334-35; Herron, supra note 14, at 736-
44. 
34. See Goodpaster, supra note 14, at 335. 
35. See id. at 334-38. 
36. Certain "mitigating" factors, such as the Jack of capacity of the defendant 
due to insanity or provocation, may be presented in the guilt phase. Most aspects 
of the defendant's life, however, would not be considered probative of a defense 
to the charge. 
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mitigation when nothing further is introduced by the defense. There-
fore, the absence of mitigating evidence is tantamount to automatic 
imposition of the death penalty. Consequently, those involved in 
death penalty litigation agree that the presentation of mitigation in 
the penalty phase is of overwhelming importanceY 
The practical importance of mitigating evidence in the penalty 
phase is matched by the Supreme Court's emphasis on the consid-
eration of mitigating evidence as a constitutional safeguard. The next 
section explores the Supreme Court's opinions in this area. 
II. THE REQUIREMENT OF MITIGATING EVIDENCE 
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." The fairly simple 
language of this amendment has spawned constant litigation since 
the early 1970s on the constitutionality of the death penalty. The 
Supreme Court has struck the death penalty down and built it back 
up. The statutes which have withstood constitutional scrutiny channel 
the discretion of the sentencer. Foremost among the safeguards 
adopted to prevent unguided discretion in imposing the death penalty 
has been the requirement that the factfinder consider the mitigating 
circumstances of each case individually. This section examines the 
historical development of the mitigation requirement. The seminal 
Furman v. Georgia38 case is analyzed to provide an understanding of 
the source of present interpretations of the eighth amendment. The 
development and scope of the requirement of considering mitigating 
evidence subsequent to Furman is then discussed. 
A. Furman v. Georgia 
In 1972 a majority of the United States Supreme Court held that 
the imposition of the death penalty was unconstitutional as cruel and 
unusual punishment. This decision, Furman v. Georgia, effectively 
invalidated the death penalty nationwide. 39 The decision consolidated 
three cases, each involving a black male defendant. In two cases, the 
37. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). See also Goodpaster, supra note 14, at 302, 
320; Herron, supra note 14, at 733. 
38. 408 u.s. 238 (1972). 
39. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell each recognized this effect of 
Furman. /d. at 315 (Marshall, J., concurring), 411 (Blackman, J. , dissenting), 415 
(Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated that "[n]ot only does [this decision] 
involve the lives of these three petitioners, but those of the almost 600 other 
condemned men and women in this country currently awaiting execution." !d. at 
316. 
1987] SYSTEMIC INTEGRITY IN CAPITAL CASES 103 
defendants were convicted of rape; in the third, murder.40 The justices 
wrote nine separate opinions, differing in their interpretations of the 
eighth amendment and the proper role of the judiciary under the 
amendment. The recurring theme of five justices was that the lack 
of any standards guiding the factfinder resulted in complete arbi-
trariness in the selection of which defendants were condemned to 
death. 
The justices agreed that the imposition of the death penalty in 
the cases before the Court was unconstitutional under the eighth 
amendment because of an arbitrary application. Both the Georgia 
and Texas statutes, under which the defendants were sentenced, left 
the decision between life and death in the hands of the factfinder 
without any guidelines.41 As a result, there was no predictability 
regarding who would receive the death penalty even if charged with 
nearly identical crimes. In Justice White's often-quoted words: 
"[T]here is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in 
which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not. " 42 Justice 
Douglas found the "uncontrolled discretion" of the factfinder to be 
constitutionally impermissible. 43 Justice Stewart similarly found the 
use of the death penalty unconstitutional because it was "so wantonly 
and so freakishly imposed. " 44 Justices Brennan and Marshall went a 
step further, finding the death penalty unconstitutional per se in 
contemporary society. Explicitly addressed as one of the factors each 
justice considered in reaching his conclusion was the arbitrary or 
discriminatory application of the death penalty. 45 
40. Furman was a murder case. The other two cases consolidated with 
Furman, Jackson v. Georgia, 171 S.E.2d 500 (Ga. 1969), cert. granted 403 U.S. 
952 (1971) (No. 69-5030), and Branch v. Texas, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1969), cert. granted 403 U.S. 952 (1971) (No. 69-5031), were rape cases. 
41. Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 n.8. 
42. !d. at 313. 
43. !d. at 253. 
44. !d. at 310. Justice Stewart also found that the death sentences before the 
court were cruel because they were excessive in terms of the punishments necesary 
to achieve legislative purposes and unusual because of the rarity of their imposition. 
!d. at 309. 
45 . !d. at 274-78, 281-82, 364-66. Justice Brennan examined whether the 
punishment by its severity was " degrading to human dignity", id. at 281; whether 
the punishment was arbitrarily imposed; whether the punishment was unacceptable 
to contemporary society; and whether the punishment was unnecessary to achieve 
the penological goal of the state and therefore excessive. !d. at 282. Justice Marshall 
also used four principles. The first two were not offended by the death penalty: 
whether the penalty was so inherently cruel that the framers barred it when they 
adopted the eighth amendment and whether the punishment was unusual in being 
unknown previously. !d. at 330-31. However, he found the death penalty unconsti-
tutional under two additional principles: it was excessive and unnecessary in view 
of the suggested purposes [retribution, deterrence, prevention of repetitive criminal 
acts, encouragement of liability pleas and confessions, eugenics and economy and 
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Although the four dissenters46 could find no eighth amendment 
violation where historically death had been accepted as a penalty, 47 
Justices Burger and Blackmun recognized individual differences 
among defendants. In the context of expressing concern that the 
Court's decision would trigger mandatory death penalty statutes 
that would fail to take into account such individual differences, 
both Justices Burger and Blackmun commented on the tempering 
quality of a jury which considers the factors of a specific case. 48 
B. The Consideration of Mitigating Evidence 
A recurring theme in statutory schemes withstanding constitu-
tional challenge since Furman has been the requirement that the 
judge or jury consider mitigating evidence when deciding the penalty 
issue. In Gregg v. Georgia,49 the Court found that state procedures 
adequately addressed the concerns of arbitrary and capricious im-
position of the death penalty where consideration of mitigating 
circumstances was required along with the finding of an aggravating 
circumstance.50 In Proffitt v. Florida,51 a statutory system using an 
advisory jury decision on the penalty was upheld where "the trial 
court's sentencing discretion is guided and channeled by a system 
that focuses on the circumstances of each individual homicide and 
individual defendant in deciding whether the death penalty is to be 
imposed. " 52 A Texas capital sentencing statute was also upheld, 
although it presented a different type of system in which the jury 
was required to answer three specific questions. 53 If all were answered 
retribution], id. at 342-51, and it would be "morally unacceptable" to present 
American society if they were appropriately informed of all the details of the death 
penalty. /d. at 360. 
46. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist. 
47. Furman , 408 U.S. at 375-470. The dissenters found that the eighth 
amendment did not prohibit the death penalty per se and, as a consequence, the 
mechanics of its imposition should be left to the state legislatures. Chief Justice 
Burger and Justice Powell specifically rejected the use of the eighth amendment to 
invalidate an unnecessarily excessive punishment. They viewed the eighth amendment 
as proscribing a form of punishment in its entirety or not at all. /d. at 396-405, 
461-65. 
48. !d. at 387-89 (Burger, J.); id. at 413 (Blackmun, J.). 
49. 428 u.s. 153 (1976). 
50. /d. at 196-98. The Court also approved of the bifurcated procedure and 
the appellate review of the case, including the proportionality of the sentence. Id. 
51. 428 u.s. 242 (1976). 
52. Id. at 258. 
53. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U .S. 262 (1976). The three questions presented to 
the jury were: 
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the 
deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation 
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affirmatively, the death penalty was imposed.54 In finding the Texas 
statute constitutional the Court again relied on the admissibility of 
any mitigating circumstances regarding an individual defendant. 55 
Mandatory death penalty statutes, on the other hand, were held 
unconstitutional because the sentencing authority was deprived of 
consideration of the individual defendant and the particular crime. 56 
In 1978 the Supreme Court specifically faced an issue involving 
the nature of mitigating evidence. In Lockett v. Ohio, 57 the Court 
held unconstitutional under the eighth amendment a statute that 
precluded the defendant from introducing evidence of her accomplice 
status and lack of intent to kill in the murder with which she was 
charged. 58 The Court in Lockett held that individualized consideration 
of mitigating factors was constitutionally required.59 In subsequent 
cases the Supreme Court has continued to reiterate the teaching of 
Lockett, that a primary safeguard against arbitrary or unjust impo-
sition of the death penalty is the consideration of any relevant 
mitigating evidence. 60 
In California v. Brown,6 ' the Court elucidated eighth amendment 
concerns by setting forth two prerequisites which must exist before 
that the death of the deceased or another would result; 
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal 
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and 
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in 
killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if 
any, by the deceased. 
Jd. at 269 (quoting TEx. CRrM. PRoc. CoDE ANN. § 37.071(b) (Vernon Supp. 1975-
76)). 
54. !d. (citing TEx. CRIM. PRoc. CoDE ANN. § 37.071(c), (e) (Vernon Supp. 
1975-76)). 
55. !d. at 271-76. 
56. Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 
U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
57. 438 u.s. 586 (1978). 
58. Id. at 602-09. 
59. !d. at 606. See also Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978) (defendant should 
have been able to introduce evidence of his youth, cooperation with the police, and 
the lack of proof of his guilt). 
60. See, e.g. , Eddings v. Oklahoma 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (error to refuse to 
consider the defendant's violent, troubled youth as mitigation); Skipper v. South 
Carolina, 476 U.S. I (1986) (trial court improperly excluded evidence of the defen-
dant's good adjustment to jail life). The concurring justices disagreed that adjustment 
to incarceration was factually mitigating in Skipper. Justice White, writing for the 
majority, stated that it was arbitrary to execute a man or woman without considering 
factors showing that death was not a "just and appropriate sentence". !d. at 1675, 
quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976); Sumner v. Shuman, 
107 S. Ct. 2716 (1987) (unconstitutional to impose mandatory death penalty without 
regard to any individualized circumstances, even on defendant already serving life 
without possibility of parole for prior conviction). 
61. 107 S. Ct. 837 (I 987). 
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a death sentence is constitutionally permissible, both of which relate 
directly or indirectly to mitigating evidence. The Court stated: 
First, sentencers may not be given unbridled discretion in determin-
ing the fates of those charged with capital offenses. The Constitution 
instead requires that death penalty statutes be structured so as to 
prevent the penalty from being administered in an arbitrary and 
unpredictable fashion. Second, even though the sentencer's discre-
tion must be restricted, the capital defendant generally must be 
allowed to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence regarding his 
"character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense. " 62 
The sentencers' discretion is typically structured by the requirement 
that they find at least one specified aggravating circumstance and 
that the aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors. 63 The second 
prerequisite the Court stated reflects the line of cases holding that a 
statutory list of mitigating circumstances cannot be exclusive. 64 The 
Court further explained how vital it is that the sentencer consider 
mitigating evidence: "Consideration of such evidence is a 'constitu-
tionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of 
death .'' ' 65 
Because consideration of mitigating evidence is indispensable to 
a constitutionally imposed death penalty, defendant should not be 
able to waive its presentation.66 The issue of waiving the constitu-
62. !d. at 839 (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110) (citations omitted). 
63. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 46 (1984). 
64. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60. 
65. Brown, 107 S. Ct. at 839, quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
at 304. Cf. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 107 S. Ct. 1821, 1822 (1987) (the sentencer may 
not refuse to consider or be precluded from considering mitigating evidence (citing 
Skipper, 426 U.S. at 1)). 
66. Nor should the mere "opportunity" to present mitigating evidence be 
considered to meet the guarantee of the nonarbitrary imposition of the death penalty. 
Presenting the quarantee of the eighth amendment in this language raises the same 
policy issues discussed in the section on waiver. Nevertheless, as discussed infra, 
one state court has viewed the eighth amendment's guarantee as one of "opportu-
nity" only. See infra text accompanying notes 146-49. Throughout the post-Furman 
cases on mitigating evidence, the Court's terminology has included both an "op-
portunity to present" and "the consideration of" mitigating evidence. Brown is a 
case in point. Does the eighth amendment guarantee only that the defendant have 
the opportunity to present mitigating evidence or does it require the actual consid-
eration of mitigating evidence by the factfinder? Two strong arguments exist why 
the constitutional mandate can only be satisfied by an actual consideration of 
mitigating evidence. 
First, the Court's language that a defendant must be "allowed" or given the 
"opportunity" to present mitigating evidence is dependent on its context. It stems 
from cases, such as Lockett and Skipper, where the defendant was not "allowed" 
to present mitigating evidence in his or her favor. Consequently, the factfinder was 
precluded from the actual consideration of that mitigating evidence in violation of 
the eighth amendment. Second, the first prerequisite set forth in Brown provides at 
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tionally-required consideration of mitigating evidence is discussed in 
the next section. 
111. WAIVER OF THE PRESENTATION OF MITIGATING EVIDENCE 
Because it is unclear precisely what the eighth amendment pro-
tections entail, the possibility of a waiver of the eighth amendment 
is a seldom-discussed phenomenonY Nevertheless, courts have been 
forced to tackle the waiver of appellate and trial rights in death 
penalty cases. As background, the first two subsections focus on the 
waiver of appellate and trial rights generally and on the waiver of 
appellate rights specifically in capital cases. The third subsection 
focuses specifically on the waiver of mitigating evidence at the trial 
level of a capital case. 
A. Appellate and Trial Rights in General 
Appeals in noncapital criminal cases are not constitutionally 
guaranteed. 68 However, the Supreme Court has held that where a 
state provides for an appellate proceeding from a criminal conviction, 
the defendant has ceitain due process and equal protection rights to 
equal access to the process. Thus, a defendant is entitled to a prepared 
transcript at state expense where the transcript is a prerequisite to 
least a guarantee that a state establish a procedure that prevents a non-arbitrary 
imposition of the death penalty. See supra text accompanying note 62. The primary 
procedure to ensure a non-arbitrary punishment in state statutes is to require that 
at least one aggravating factor be found and that aggravating factors be balanced 
with mitigating factors. The Court has stated that this procedure is not necessarily 
the only way to meet the constitutional requirement of a non-arbitrary punishment. 
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 45 (1984). However, the constitutional requirement 
of a non-arbitrary system of capital punishment cannot be fulfilled by only affording 
the defendant the opportunity to present mitigating evidence. In most cases the 
opportunity to present the mitigating evidence will result in actual consideration of 
mitigation. This is true even if a strategic decision is made that the best presentation 
of mitigation is no hard evidence in the penalty phase. See Darden v. Wainwright, 
477 U.S. 168 (1986); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). It is primarily 
where the defendant refuses to pursue the "opportunity" that the distinction between 
opportunity and actual consideration could conceivably make a difference. If the 
defendant were free to reject this opportunity, that individual defendant would be 
capable of undoing the constitutional basis of the statutory scheme. It is the 
individual consideration of each defendant and each case on the same bases that 
the Court has found sufficiently channels the factfinder's discretion to meet consti-
tutional requirements. 
67. See Weisberg, supra note 7 at 322, 354-55, 358. The Supreme Court 
appears willing to accept various procedures as long as they guarantee a non-
arbitrary result. Compare CAL. PENAL CoDE § 190.3 (West 1987) Uury compares 
statutory aggravating factors with mitigating factors) with TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE 
ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1986) Uury must answer three questions affirmatively). 
68. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). 
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perfecting an appeal. 69 The defendant is also entitled to an attorney 
on a first appeal by right in state court.70 Nevertheless, a defendant 
ordinarily must affirmatively invoke the "right" to appeal in non-
capital criminal cases by a timely filing of the appropriate petition. 71 
Thus, the defendant may waive appellate rights by choice or by 
inaction. 
In contrast, the courts refuse to permit a waiver of constitutionally 
guaranteed trial rights in noncapital criminal cases in certain circum-
stances. The defendant's ability to waive may be conditioned on 
consent of the State, or upon a preliminary finding by the court. 
Precluding a defendant from waiving a trial right does not necessarily 
vitiate the defendant's constitutional protections. As the Supreme 
Court stated in Singer v. United States, 72 "[t]he ability to waive a 
constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist 
upon the opposite of that right ... " Accordingly, in Singer, the 
Court upheld the condition of prosecutorial consent for waiver of a 
jury. 73 The defendant was afforded his sixth amendment guarantee 
of a jury; the Constitution does not guarantee the opposite, a right 
to a bench trial. 7 4 The sixth amendment similarly guarantees the right 
to a speedy and public trial. 75 There is no guarantee of a right to 
plead guilty. Although defendants routinely enter guilty pleas, many 
state rules, as well as the federal rules, require the court to determine 
the factual basis for the plea.76 If the plea lacks a factual basis, the 
court must reject the plea and order that the trial proceed. Once 
again, the defendant is only required to undergo what the Consti-
tution guarantees. There is no deprivation of any right. 
Even where the Constitution implicitly guarantees an alternative 
to the stated constitutional right, waiver is not absolute. This occurs 
with the stated sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel which 
is accompanied by an implicit right to self-representation. The implied 
constitutional alternative of self-representation, recognized in Faretta 
v. California," is based on historical facts. The early English com-
mon-law system did not permit representation by counsel in felony 
cases. 78 Even in early colonial times, the Court noted that such 
69. Griffin v. lllinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
70. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). This right was not extended 
to discretionary appeals. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S . 600 (1974). 
71. See, e.g. , FED. R. APP. P. 4(b) (10 days); CAL. RuLES OF CouRT 31(a) 
(West 1987) (60 days); Mo. SuP. CT. R. 81.04(a) (10 days). 
72. 380 u.s. 24, 34-35 (1965). 
73 . /d. at 37. 
74. !d. at 34-36. 
75. See supra note 4. 
76. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f). 
77. 422 u.s. 806 (1975). 
78. /d. at 823. 
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representation was exclusively the defendant's choice.79 Consequently, 
the Supreme Court viewed the right to defend as a personal right, 
as distinguished from the rights listed in other amendments . 8° From 
a practical point of view, it would be possible to give the defendant 
a jury trial without his agreement, but virtually impossible to give 
him "assistance" of counsel without his active participation.81 Thus, 
both the history and the nature of the right led the Court to imply 
an alternative right to the specified constitutional right to counsel 
that does not exist with respect to the right to a jury and to a trial 
itself. 
Nevertheless, even in the context of the hallowed right to self-
representation, the systemic interest in just proceedings prevails over 
the individual right. The court cannot permit a waiver unless it finds 
that the defendant's waiver is knowing and intelligent. 82 Standby 
counsel can be appointed with or without the defendant's consent.83 
A defendant's exercise of the right to self-representation may be 
revoked if the defendant obstructs the course of the trial. 84 
The integrity of the judicial system justifies the restrictions on 
waiving constitutional rights. Requiring the consent of the prosecutor 
or the approval of the court before a defendant may waive a jury 
allows the state to prevent a biased or partial hearing.85 Requiring a 
factual basis for a guilty plea not only protects the defendant from 
a faulty conviction, but also safeguards society's interest in preventing 
the conviction of an innocent person.86 The majority in Faretta, 
which so forcefully found a right of self-representation, acknowledged 
that a "strong" argument could be made that a defendant should 
be forced to accept a lawyer when the assistance of counsel is 
necessary for a fair trial. 87 
The three dissenting justices in Faretta88 emphasized that the 
Court and the prosecutor have a duty to see that justice is done and 
that "[t]he system of criminal justice should not be available as an 
79. ld. at 818, 826-30. 
80. ld. at 821. 
81. ld. at 832. 
82. Id. at 835-36. 
83 . McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 184 (1984). 
84. Id. at 184, quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 n.46. "'The 
right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. 
Neither is it a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedure and substantive 
law."' !d. at 184. 
85. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965). 
86. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969). Cf. Santobello v. 
New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971). 
87. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 833. 
88. The dissenters in Faretta were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun 
and Rehnquist. 
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instrument of self-destruction. " 89 The dissent of Justice Blackmun 
further viewed the State's interest in securing a fair system of criminal 
justice as an important consideration: 
True freedom of choice and society's interest in seeing that justice 
is achieved can be vindicated only if the trial court retains discretion 
to reject any attempted waiver of counsel and insist that the accused 
be tried according to the Constitution. This discretion is as critical 
an element of basic fairness as a trial judge's discretion to decline 
to accept a plea of guilty. 90 
The continuous theme of the Supreme Court's waiver cases is that 
the integrity of the system is a major concern even at the expense 
of an individual defendant's choice. 
The integrity of the criminal justice system is similarly jeopardized 
if eighth amendment protections can be waived without principled 
limitations. The language and history of the amendment support such 
an interpretation. There is no alternative right to choose one's own 
punishment stated in the amendment. Moreover, such a right cannot 
be implied from the history of the amendment, which was primarily 
designed to preclude unlawful abusive punishment.91 Even the right 
to self-representation does not guarantee an absolute right to the 
alternative to assistance of counsel, no representation at all. 
Moreover, the societal interest in precluding arbitrary imposition 
of the death penalty is strong. The Court's concern with the reliability 
of the determination to impose death is apparent in every decision. 
The death penalty is irreversible. In Woodson v. North Carolina, 92 
the Court stated: ''Because of that qualitative difference, there is a 
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determi-
nation that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case. " 93 
A necessary part of ensuring reliability in the process is the consid-
eration of the individual and the particular crime.94 The consideration 
of mitigating evidence in the penalty phase of a bifurcated proceeding 
has become the standard method of meeting this requirement. 95 
89. !d. at 836-39. 
90. !d. at 840. Justice Blackmun specifically believed that the defendant's 
freedom of choice should yield to the system's integrity. /d. at 849. 
91. The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment stems from the English 
Bill of Rights and probably was designed to preclude the government from imposing 
outlawed penalties. The history of the inclusion of the eighth amendment in the Bill 
of Rights in this country is sparse. The major concern appeared to be the possibility 
of the federal government having the power to impose torturous punishments. 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 258-64, 316-22 (1972). 
92. 428 u.s. 280 (1976). 
93. /d. at 305. 
94. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305; Furman, 408 U.S. at 307-08 (Stewart, 
J., concurring); California v. Brown, 107 S. Ct. 837, 839 (1987). 
95. See Weisberg, supra note 7, at 309. 
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Where society's interest in the reliability of the decision-making 
process in death penalty cases is manifested in an individualized 
determination based on aggravating and mitigating circumstances, a 
waiver of one part of this structure invalidates the delicately balanced 
protection for safeguarding against arbitrary imposition of the death 
penalty. The next two sections review how the courts have responded 
when a defendant sentenced to death seeks to forego trial level and 
appellate protections by examining first, appellate review on both a 
federal and state level and second, the trial level presentation of 
mitigating evidence. 
B. Appellate Rights in Capital Cases 
Defendants may try to waive appellate rights in capital cases on 
both the federal and state level. The United States Supreme Court 
has been faced with third-party petitions on behalf of sentenced 
defendants who do not wish to pursue legal avenues. The Court has 
treated these cases as issues of standing. 96 Some state appellate courts 
in jurisdictions with mandatory appellate review of death sentences 
have had to decide whether a defendant can be allowed to forego 
such review. 97 Generally holding that a defendant cannot waive the 
review, those courts have tended to base their decisions on a statutory 
theory. Although the accepted waiver of federal discretionary appel-
late review by capital defendants is disturbing, the rationale of those 
cases is not controlling at the trial level where the mitigating evidence 
must be presented or the safeguard is lost. The rationale of the state 
appellate cases which preclude a waiver of an automatic appeal is 
more applicable to the trial-level waiver issue. This case law will be 
discussed in two subsections: first, the few Supreme Court orders 
and second, the lower court decisions rejecting a waiver of mandatory 
review. 
1. Discretionary Federal Appellate Review 
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed a defendant's right 
to waive eighth amendment protections. The Court has permitted 
defendants facing the death penalty to forego review in the Supreme 
Court on jurisdictional grounds.98 Implicit in these decisions which 
terminate review of a death sentence at the defendant's request is a 
finding that any discretionary post-trial federal review can be waived 
96. See infra text accompanying notes 98-115. 
97. See infra text accompanying notes 116-33. 
98. Hammett v. Texas, 448 U.S. 725 (1980); Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 
1301 (1979); Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S. 1301 (1979); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 
1012 (1976). 
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by a competent99 defendant. The few opinions in this area do not 
explicitly speak in eighth amendment terms. 
The Supreme Court's order in Gilmore v. Utah 100 stated that 
Gilmore knowingly and intelligently waived "any and all federal 
rights he might have asserted after the Utah trial court's sentence 
was imposed . . . . " 101 However, the concurring opinion by Chief 
Justice Burger, in which Justice Powell joined, addressed only the 
procedural question of a lack of jurisdiction to consider the case 
where a competent defendant chooses to forego such review. 102 Justice 
Burger found that Gilmore's mother, who initiated the application 
for the stay as a third party, lacked standing to raise any issues on 
Gilmore's behalf .103 Chief Justice Burger dismissed the possible eighth 
amendment challenge to Utah's death penalty statute in a footnote 
on the basis that no one with standing had challenged it. 104 He also 
declined to decide whether a defendant has a right to waive state 
appellate review. 105 Justice Stevens' concurrence, joined by Justice 
Rehnquist, similarly focused on the lack of jurisdiction where a 
competent defendant has chosen to forego his access to the appellate 
courts. 106 In dissent, Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and 
Marshall, argued that a defendant could not waive a state court 
resolution of the constitutionality of the Utah death penalty statute. 107 
In Justice White's opinion, this would mean that a defendant could 
99. A primary concern for courts faced with a defendant who wishes to 
forego legal recourse is the competency of the defendant to make decisions on his 
or her behalf. See Felde v. Blackburn, 795 F.2d 400, 403 (5th Cir. 1986) (remanded 
for determination whether competency finding supported by record and, even so, 
whether defense counsel should have requested a second competency hearing. Al-
though defendant now sought habeas, he had asked for death at this trial. See infra 
text accompanying notes 163-65 for a discussion of this case); Rumbaugh v. 
Procunier, 753 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1985) (next-friend petition dismissed as defendant 
found competent); Hays v. Murphy, 663 F.2d 1004 (lOth Cir. 1981) (dismissal of 
next-friend petition reversed and remanded for further competency determination); 
Smith v. Armontrout , 632 F . Supp. 503 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (next-friend petition 
dismissed as defendant found competent); Groseclose ex ref. Harries v. Dutton, 594 
F. Supp. 949 (M.D. Tenn. 1984) (next-friend has standing where defendant is 
incompetent and has not voluntarily waived his postconviction remedies because of 
death row conditions). For a thorough commentary on standards applied to determine 
competency and voluntariness, see Strafer, Volunteering for Execution: Competency, 
Voluntariness and the Propriety of Third Party Intervention, 74 J. CluM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 860, 876-94 (1983). 
100. 429 u.s. 1012 (1976). 
101. /d. at 1013. 
102. /d. at 1013-17. 
103. /d. at 1014. 
104. /d. at 1017 n.7 . 
105. /d. at 1017. 
106. /d. 
107. /d. at 1018. 
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consent to an unconstitutional punishment. 108 Justice Marshall, also 
writing in dissent, stated that the eighth amendment "expresses a 
fundamental interest of society in ensuring that state authority is not 
used to administer barbaric punishments," which interest an individ-
ual defendant cannot waive. 109 
In two subsequent cases, the Court was even less explanatory. In 
Lenhard v. Wo/ff 10 the Court denied an application for a stay of 
Jesse Bishop's execution. Bishop's public defenders had filed the 
application without his consent. In Hammett v. Texas111 the Court, 
in a per curiam opinion, permitted the defendant to withdraw his 
petition for certiorari, which had been filed by his attorney against 
his wishes. 112 Citing Gilmore and Rule 60 of the Rules of the Supreme 
Court, the Court found "no basis under Rule 60" for denying the 
defendant's motion. 113 Rule 60 required a dismissal when an appellant 
or petitioner moved to dismiss the proceeding in which he or she 
was a party. 114 
The Court has avoided the eighth amendment issue implicit in 
these cases. By resolving the third-party petition cases on a jurisdic-
tional basis, the Court has left open the question of whether state 
appellate review is a necessary part of the eighth amendment's 
guarantees and, if so, whether a defendant can waive its protection. 
Although the Court has upheld statutory schemes with appellate 
review provisions, it has never explicitly held that appellate review is 
mandatory under the eighth amendment. 115 Although a· few state 
appellate courts have decided whether defendants could waive ap-
pellate review of a death sentence, their decisions, too, do not reflect 
a clear-cut view of eighth amendment requirements. These state 
decisions are considered next. 
2. State Appellate Review 
States with a death penalty are virtually unanimous in requiring 
appellate review of a capital sentence. All but one of the thirty-seven 
108. !d. 
109. !d. at 1019. Justice Blackmun also dissented individually. In his view, 
the questions of standing and constitutionality of the Utah death penalty statute 
were not "insubstantial" and should have been given "plenary, not summary, 
consideration." !d. at 1020. 
110. 444 u.s. 1301 (1979). 
Ill. 448 u.s. 725 (1980). 
112. !d. 
113. !d. 
114. 28 U.S.C.A. SuP. CT. R. 53 (19) R.60(b) (1980), in effect when Gilmore 
was decided, is now codified as Rule 53. 
115. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). The Court refers to three 
opinions in Furman whose authors found meaningful appellate review necessary. !d. 
at 45. In Pulley itself, the Court found sufficient safeguards, including appellate 
review, without a proportionality review. Id. at 51-54. The Court never states, 
however, that appellate review itself is necesary. !d. at 50-51. 
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states with the death penalty have an automatic review provision. 116 
The issue of a defendant's right to waive appellate review has been 
raised in several of those states. 117 The courts have been forced to 
decide whether a defendant's interest in death is outweighed by a 
societal interest. Several courts facing this issue have held that a 
defendant cannot waive automatic review required by a state stat-
ute.118 Whether the appellate review is constitutionally mandated is 
not directly before the courts 119 because review of the death sentence 
is statutorily required. The primary issue facing these courts, there-
fore, is not whether waiver of the appeal is synonymous with waiving 
an eighth amendment protection, but whether the waiver of a stat-
utory protection is permissible. Nevertheless, the reasoning of these 
courts has constitutional underpinnings. 
One approach taken by the courts is to permit the defendant to 
waive the appeal of the conviction, but not of the death sentence. 
Both the Indiana120 and Nevada121 courts have used this approach. 122 
116. See ALA. Com § 12-22-243 (1987); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. R. C!uM. P. 
31.2(b) (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239 (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-
103(7)(a) (1986); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46b (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. II, § 4209(g) (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(4) (West 1985); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 17-10-35(a) (1982); IDAHO CODE § 19-2827(a) (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. 
ch.IIOA, para. 606(a) (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND. CoDE § 35-50-2-9(h) (1986); KY. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.075 (Baldwin 1985); LA. CoDE CRIM. PRoc . ANN. art. 905.9 
(West 1984); Mo. CoDE ANN. art. 27, § 414 (1982); Mrss. CoDE ANN. § 99-19-105 
(1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.035 (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT. CoDE ANN. § 46-
18-307 (1987); NEB. REv. STAT.§ 29-2525 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT.§ 177.055 (1986); 
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(vi) (1986); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:1 1-3(e) (Supp. 
1987); N .M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4 (1986) N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(1) 
(1983); Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 2929.05 (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
21, § 701.13 (West Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(6) (Supp. 1987); 42 PA. 
CoNs. STAT. § 9711(h) (1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25(A) (Law. Co-op 1985); 
S.D. CoDIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-27A-9 (1979); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 39-2-205(a) 
(1982); TEx. CRJM. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 37 .071(h) (Vernon Supp. 1988); UTAH CoDE 
ANN. § 76-3-206 (1978); VT. R. APP. P. 3(b) (Supp. 1987); VA. CoDE ANN. § 17-
110.1 (Supp. 1987); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.95.100 (Supp. 1987); WYo. STAT. 
§ 6-2-103 (1983). 
117. There certainly may be cases where defendants do not appeal in a state 
without a mandatory review. In such a state it would be more perfunctory, involving 
a failure or choice not to perfect the appeal, the same as in any other criminal case. 
Even in states with a mandatory review, it is possible that some have interpreted 
their statutes to permit a waiver. See, e.g. , State v. Gilmore, No. 14852 (Utah Nov. 
10, 1976) (order permitting Gilmore to withdraw any appeal and to vacate stay of 
execution in a state with an automatic review). 
118. See infra text accompanying notes 120-32. 
119. The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue of whether an 
automatic appeal is required by the eighth amendment. One state court has inter-
preted Gilmore to mean that the eighth amendment does not require mandatory 
state review because Gilmore waived his state appeal in Utah. Collins v. State, 261 
Ark. 195, 548 S.W.2d 106, 112 (1977). 
120. Judy v. State, 275 Ind. 145, 416 N.E.2d 95 (1981). 
121. Cole v. State, 101 Nev. 585, 707 P.2d 545 (1985). 
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Whether the courts have necessarily based these decisions on consti-
tutional or statutory grounds is unclear. The Indiana court, however, 
found that the mandatory review provision met the constitutional 
requirement of "assur[ing] 'consistency, fairness, and rationality in 
the evenhanded operation' of the death penalty statute." 123 This 
language implies that the appellate review is a necessary part of a 
constitutional death penalty statute. The Nevada court, on the other 
hand, more explicitly limited the basis of its decision to a statutory 
mandate. 124 Nevertheless, even the Nevada court reviewed the pro-
portionality of the sentence in the case before it, a process that was 
usually considered an eighth amendment requirement in the past. 125 
Other courts have emphasized balancing the public's interest 
against the individual defendant's choices. The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania held it had jurisdiction to raise, sua sponte, the con-
stitutionality of the state death penalty statute in Commonwealth v. 
McKenna. 126 It held that the defendant had not waived appellate 
review of the issue by failing to raise it below .127 The court implicitly 
found that the appellate review was necessary to meet constitutional 
standards. It held that the court had a duty to "insur[e] that capital 
punishment in this Commonwealth comports with the Constitution 
of the United States .... " 128 The California Supreme Court has 
held that its statute requires an automatic review of the conviction 
and of the sentence. 129 In both California and Pennsylvania, the 
courts emphasized the state's interest in rendering justice and ensuring 
that a death sentence would not be imposed unless appropriate. As 
the Pennsylvania court noted, although ''a defendant may normally 
make an informed and voluntary waiver of rights personal to himself, 
121. Cole v. State, 101 Nev. 585, 707 P.2d 545 (1985). 
122. The Indiana court referred to the Gilmore decision as authority that a 
defendant under sentence of death could constitutionally, knowingly and intelligently, 
waive state appellate review. Judy, 275 Ind. at 145, 416 N.E.2d at 97-98. This 
misses the point made by Chief Justice Burger in Gilmore that the Court was dealing 
only with waiver of federal appeals subsequent to the State appeal. See supra text 
accompanying note 104. 
123. 275 Ind. at 145, 416 N.E.2d at 108 (citations omitted). 
124. The Nevada statute required 1) an automatic filing of an appeal that 
could be waived within 30 days and 2) a review of the sentence regardless of the 
waiver. Cole, 101 Nev. at 589, 707 P.2d at 547-48. 
125. But see Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 44-57 (1984), which held that a 
proportionality review is not constitutionally required if the statute adequately limits 
the discretion of the fact finder. 
126. 476 Pa. 428, 383 A.2d 174 (1978). 
127. Jd. at 437-42, 383 A.2d 179-81 (defendant did appeal his conviction in 
McKenna, so whether or not he could waive appeal was not an issue). 
128. Id. at 441, 383 A.2d at 181. 
129. People v. Stanworth, 71 Cal.2d 820, 457 P.2d 889, 80 Cal. Rptr. 49 
(1969). This procedure was upheld in a subsequent case before the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Massie v. Summer, 624 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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his freedom to do so must give way where a substantial public policy 
is involved .... " 130 The court concluded that, because the death 
penalty is irrevocable, society's interests supersede the individual 
defendant's interests .131 The California court similarly emphasized 
that a defendant may not waive a right that reflects a "principle of 
fundamental public policy." 132 
The analysis of public policy in these state cases is important to 
eighth amendment jurisprudence, even if the decisions are not based 
on the Constitution. The statutes were drafted in response to the 
United States Supreme Court's decisions on the death penalty. The 
state courts recognized the constitutional basis of their statutes in 
their statements regarding the assurance of fairness in imposing the 
death penalty. 133 The analysis used in these state cases concerning 
waiver of an appeal can appropriately be applied to the trial-level 
penalty phase. The critical issue is the same: a balancing of the 
public policy against the individual defendant's choices. 
C. Mitigating Evidence at the Penalty Phase of Trial 
The failure to present mitigating evidence is most often raised as 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the sixth amendment. 
The sixth amendment's implied guarantee that a defendant can 
control his own defense134 would appear to control whether or not 
mitigating evidence is presented in the penalty phase. Both the 
defendant's right to self-representation and to make decisions which 
determine the merits of the case could lead to the conclusion that 
the defendant should control the presentation of evidence on his 
behalf. But this sixth amendment focus ignores the competing eighth 
amendment concern of whether the death penalty is unconstitutionally 
cruel and unusual. 
The few courts which have faced the issue of a defendant who 
refuses to present mitigating evidence have advanced differing theo-
ries.1 35 One end of the spectrum is represented by the Nevada and 
130. McKenna, 416 Pa. at 440, 383 A.2d at 181. 
131. /d. 
132. Stanworth, 71 Cal. 2d at 834, 457 P.2d at 899, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 59. The 
California court points out that the inability to waive a right occurs in other 
situations as well where a fundamental public policy is at stake, such as an invalid 
condition of probation or separation of a jury after commencement of deliberations. 
/d. at 833-34, 457 P.2d at 898-99, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 58-59. Stanworth was not 
permitted to waive the jury in the penalty phase. !d. at 829, 457 P.2d at 895, 80 
Cal. Rptr. at 55. 
133. See supra text accompanying notes 123-32. 
134. See supra text accompanying notes 77-80. 
135. The issue may have arisen in other cases as well which were decided on 
other grounds. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Davis, 479 Pa. 274, 388 A.2d 324 
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Louisiana courts which have held that a defendant's choice to forego 
presentation of mitigating evidence does not offend eighth amend-
ment principles and is consistent with the defendant's rights under 
the sixth amendment. 136 At the other end of the spectrum, the 
California and New Jersey courts have required the presentation of 
mitigating evidence over the objection of the defendant. 137 The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals took a middle-of-the-road approach by 
upholding a death penalty against a sixth amendment challenge, 
without addressing any eighth amendment issues. 138 Also on a middle 
ground, a Missouri appellate court has found no sixth amendment 
violation under similar circumstances, but raised, without resolving, 
the eighth amendment issue. 139 
The most direct statement by a court that there is no eighth 
amendment violation when the defendant chooses not to present 
mitigating evidence is advanced by the Nevada Supreme Court. In 
Bishop v. State140 the Nevada Supreme Court found no constitutional 
error in the failure to consider mitigating evidence at the penalty 
phase. 141 Bishop represented himself with only standby counsel avail-
able.142 He pled guilty to the capital charge of murdering a Las Vegas 
casino employee during the course of a robbery. 143 A sentencing 
hearing was conducted before a three-judge panel. 144 The state pre-
sented evidence of aggravating circumstances and Bishop presented 
nothing. His standby counsel advised the court that mitigating evi-
dence existed, but Bishop refused to have it presented. The three-
judge panel conducted no further inquiry .145 On appeal, standby 
counsel'46 argued that the panel erred in failing to consider mitigating 
evidence. 147 The Nevada court reasoned that Bishop's sixth amend-
ment right to self-representation would have been abrogated if he 
(1978), where the defendant, representing himself, presented no mitigating evidence 
and made no statement to the jury on his behalf. Because the court reversed the 
death sentence and imposed life imprisonment on the basis of the unconstitutionality 
of the sentencing legislation, it never addressed the issue of the constitutionality of 
a death sentence imposed without a consideration of mitigating evidence. 
136. See infra text accompanying notes 140-65. 
137. See infra text accompanying notes 197-242. 
138. See infra text accompanying notes 166-73. 
139. See infra text accompanying notes 174-94. 
140. 95 Nev. 511, 597 P.2d 273 (1979) (Bishop's attorneys sought a third-
party application for a stay of his execution in Lenhard v. Wolff). 
141. Bishop, 95 Nev. at 517, 597 P.2d at 277. 
142. Id. at 513-14, 597 P.2d at 274. 
143. Id. at 511, 597 P.2d at 273. 
144. Id. at 514, 597 P.2d at 274. 
145. Id. at 515, 597 P.2d at 274. 
146. Apparently the trial standby attorneys were asked to present the appeal. 
Id. at 516, 597 P .2d at 275. 
147. Id. at 516, 597 P.2d at 276. 
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had not been allowed to control the direction of his defense, including 
the decision not to present one. 148 The court viewed the opportunity 
to present mitigating evidence as sufficient. 149 The dissenting justice 
recognized the systemic interest in the integrity of the criminal justice 
process.150 He argued that the right to self-representation should have 
yielded to the state's interest and constitutional duty under the eighth 
amendment to assure a just sentence. 151 
In State v. Felde152 the Louisiana Supreme Court relied on Bishop 
to find that a defendant could block efforts to present mitigating 
evidence. The aggravating circumstance in this case was the status 
of the victim as a police officer. 153 Felde, seated in the backseat of 
a squad car after being arrested on a public intoxication charge, 
grabbed the gun of the officer in the driver 's seat and shot him three 
times .154 An escapee from a Maryland prison where he was serving 
a sentence for manslaughter and assault, Felde claimed that he had 
intended to shoot himself, not the officer .155 He claimed that the gun 
fired when the officer pushed him backwards. 156 Felde was convicted 
in the guilt phase. The defense attorney agreed, at Felde's request, 
to ask the jury for death if the jury failed to find Felde not guilty 
by reason of insanity .157 Both Felde, as co-counsel, and his attorney 
asked that the death penalty be imposed on him in the penalty 
phase.158 
The Louisiana court primarily focused on the sixth amendment, 
eliminating the eighth amendment concern by an expansion of Gil-
more.159 The court interpreted Gilmore as permitting a waiver of 
constitutional rights at the trial as well as at the appellate level. 160 
As is typical, the issue was framed as a sixth amendment, ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. Appellate counsel faulted the trial attor-
ney for acquiescing in Felde's demand that no alternatives other than 
not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty of first degree murder with 
the death penalty be pursued. 161 The Louisiana court found no fault 
in the defense attorney's actions on the basis that a defendant has 
148. !d. 
149. !d. 
150. !d. at 516, 597 P.2d at 278-79. 
151. !d. 
152. 422 So. 2d 370 (La. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 918 (1983). 




157. /d. at 393. 
158. !d. at 393-94. 
159. 429 u.s. 436 (1976). 
160. Felde, 422 So. 2d at 395 . 
161. !d. at 393-95. 
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the right to control the defense at the penalty phase.162 In a subsequent 
habeas appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case 
to the federal district court for a determination whether the state 
court's finding that Felde was competent to stand trial and waive his 
right to have counsel present mitigating evidence was supported by 
the record. 163 The court viewed this as an effective assistance of 
counsel issue. 164 The Fifth Circuit did not appear to question the 
constitutionality of permitting a competent defendant to waive a trial-
level presentation of mitigating evidence. 165 
The Fifth Circuit's focus on the sixth amendment in Felde is 
consistent with its approach in an earlier decision, Autry v. Mc-
Kaskle.166 In Autry, the court was forced to address more directly 
the constitutional issues faced when a defendant chooses to forego 
mitigating evidence. However, the court never discussed the eighth 
amendment. A jury convicted Autry of killing a store clerk in the 
course of a robbery and sentenced him to death. 167 Autry refused to 
permit his attorney to call witnesses on his behalf in the penalty 
phase. 168 In the habeas proceeding, Autry sought a certificate of 
probable cause and a stay of his execution. 169 Autry claimed he had 
162. !d. at 395. The court cited to the denial of Bishop's stay in Lenhard v. 
Wolff, as authority that a waiver of presenting mitigating evidence at the trial stage 
is not arbitrary punishment. !d. The denial of the stay, however, indicates that the 
Court does not believe it will grant certiorari. 
163. Felde v. Blackburn, 795 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1986). . 
164. !d. at 401. 
165. Id. at 401-03. 
166. 727 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1984). The Felde court cited Autry v. McKaskle 
for the proposition that a defendant could direct his attorney not to argue against 
the imposition of the death penalty without subjecting the attorney to an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim if the defendant is competent. Felde, 795 F.2d at 
401-02. 
167. Autry v. Estelle, 706 F.2d 1394, 1398 (5th Cir. 1983). 
168. Autry v. McKaskle, 727 F.2d 358, 360-61 (5th Cir. 1984). 
169. This was Autry's third habeas proceeding. The first one, which resulted 
in a denial of relief, did not raise an issue of ineffectiveness of counsel in the 
penalty phase. Autry v. Estelle, 706 F.2d 1394 (5th Cir. 1983). The United States 
Supreme Court also denied his request for a stay. Autry v. Estelle, 464 U.S. I 
(1983). He immediately filed a second habeas petition which did allege ineffective 
assistance of counsel. It was denied by the district court and the circuit court of 
appeals. However, Justice White granted a stay pending the resolution of Harris v. 
Pulley, 692 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 460 U.S. 1036 (1983), where 
the issue raised was whether a proportionality review was constitutionally required, 
an issue also raised by Autry. After the Supreme Court's decision in Pulley v. 
Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984), that a proportionality review was not necessarily required 
by the Constitution, Autry pursued only his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
and infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in this habeas proceeding. The eighth 
amendment claim, rejected by the Fifth Circuit, stemmed from a delay in unstrapping 
him from the gurney when Justice White issued the stay shortly before his scheduled 
execution. Autry v. McKaskle, 727 F.2d 358, 363 (5th Cir. 1984). 
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received ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to 
present mitigating evidence in the penalty stage. 170 
The Fifth Circuit found no constitutional error in the attorney's 
decision to accede to Autry's choice to block any efforts to present 
mitigating evidence. 171 The court did not resolve the question whether 
the decision to forego mitigating evidence is a personal choice of the 
defendant's or a tactical decision reserved to the lawyer. In the 
court's view, once Autry knowingly made the decision to preclude 
mitigating evidence, the attorney was ethically bound to honor his 
decision. 172 The Fifth Circuit did nothing further to address any 
eighth amendment issue concerning the imposition of an arbitrary 
punishment without consideration of mitigating evidence. 173 
In Trimble v. State, 174 the Missouri Court of Appeals for the 
Western District pointedly acknowledged the problem of reconciling 
the need for ensuring the non-arbitrary imposition of the death 
penalty through the consideration of mitigating evidence with the 
role of counsel in adhering to the defendant's decision to forego 
evidence at the penalty stage of the proceeding. 175 Trimble was 
convicted of strangling a fellow jail inmate to death to prevent him 
from revealing that Trimble had subjected him to physical and sexual 
abuse. He was sentenced to death by a jury .176 At trial, at a hearing 
on a postconviction motion to set aside the sentence, and on appeal 
from a denial of that motion, Trimble tried to block his attorney's 
efforts to challenge the sentence. 177 At trial, Trimble had barred his 
attorney from either presenting mitigating evidence or making an 
argument on his behalf in the penalty phase of the trial. 178 
On appeal from the denial of the postconviction motion, Trim-
ble's attorneys nevertheless argued ineffective assistance of counsel 
in the penalty phase. 179 They first argued that the American Bar 
170. Id. at 360. Autry further claimed that, if the attorney failed to gather 
mitigating evidence because the defendant blocked such efforts, the attorney was 
also ineffective in not requesting a competency determination. Id. The court rejected 
this argument. Id. at 362. 
171. /d. 
172. !d. The court did note, however , that the attorney should have made a 
record of disagreeing with the defendant, citing to the ABA's Defense Function 
Standard 5.2(c) (1979). /d. 
173. Autry, 727 F.2d at 362-63. 
174. 693 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). 
175. /d. at 280. 
176. /d. at 269. 
177. !d. at 276. Defendant filed a motion pro se in a federal appeal, stating 
his counsel had no authority to raise issues regarding his sentencing procedure. Id. 
178. /d. 
179. Counsel for Trimble raised multitudinous issues regarding the sentencing 
phase, but the court found the issue of client decision-making dispositive. /d. The 
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Association Defense Function180 list of client decisions was exhaus-
tive.181 Because the Defense Function divides trial decisions into those 
a client makes and those an attorney makes, they argued that the 
decision whether to present mitigating evidence was part of the 
attorney's responsibilities. 182 They then argued that the trial attorney 
was incompetent in not making a tactical decision to further Trimble's 
interests in the penalty phase by presenting mitigating evidence. 183 
The State argued that it was the defendant's choice whether to pursue 
legal action on his own behalf, citing the cases in which the Supreme 
Court rejected third-party appeals184 on behalf of a defendant. 
The Missouri court dismissed the state's argument by distinguish-
ing an appeal from a trial. The court noted that, at the point when 
a defendant is deciding whether or not to pursue an appeal, the 
"normal defense function" has already been performed.185 The court 
referred to the American Bar Association's Model Code and the 
Defense Function in finding that a defendant has the option to make 
informed choices.186 The court recognized the irony if a defendant 
could waive the right to counsel and represent himself and yet, could 
not make decisions about his defense when he was represented by 
counsel. 187 The court further noted that, under the current state of 
the law, counsel is virtually insulated from an ineffectiveness claim 
issues raised included: 
failing to present argument or evidence at sentencing or at trial and stating 
to the jury none would be presented; failing to raise issues concerning 
evidence of other crimes relating to the confinement, which was the 
aggravating circumstance; failing to request a separate panel for punishment 
after evidence of other crimes was presented; failing to request instructions 
on presumption of innocence, of aggravating circumstances, and requiring 
a finding that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circum-
stances beyond a reasonable doubt. /d. 
Further error was alleged in the postconviction motion hearing in " finding ... a 
knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel, predicated on the movant's direction not 
to present evidence and argument at the sentencing hearing." /d. Error was also 
claimed in "refusing to admit expert testimony of lawyers on the issue of ineffec-
tiveness, a claimed defect in the jury's sentencing verdict, and asserted improper 
proportionality review." /d. They also argued that Trimble had involuntarily waived 
his right to counsel. /d. at 277. This apparently arose because Trimble had a history 
of psychiatric problems, beginning at age five or six and continuing through his 
suicide attempt while in jail at an earlier time. /d. 
180. See infra text accompanying note 265. 
181. Trimble, 693 S.W.2d at 277. 
182. /d. 
183. /d. 
184. /d. The State apparently raised cases such as Gilmore v. Utah and Lenhard 
v. Wolff, where third parties tried to prevent executions of individuals who wanted 
to end all attempts to save their lives. See supra text accompanying notes 100-114. 
185. Trimble, 693 S.W.2d at 277. 
186. /d. at 279. 
187. /d. 
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when he or she accedes to the defendant's wishes. 188 The court 
consequently found no violation of the sixth amendment in the 
sentencing phase of this case. 189 
Although the Missouri court further appropriately defined the 
issue as a conflict between the eighth and sixth amendments, it failed 
to take its holding beyond the ineffectiveness claim. Judge Dixon, 
writing for the panel, recognized that mitigating evidence is essential 
to a constitutionally imposed death penalty. He stated that ''it is the 
information and guidance given to the sentencing authority which 
enables it to exercise discretion in imposing the death penalty without 
random, freakish, or discriminatory results." 190 The court further 
commented that this concern for a just imposition of the penalty 
was greater than the individual rights of the defendant. 191 The court 
noted that the function of weighing aggravating and mitigating factors 
was "neglected" in this case. 192 Nevertheless, the court chose to 
decide the issue within the realm of the sixth amendment only and 
could find no fault with counsel's actions. 193 Trimble's conviction, 
however, was reversed on other grounds. 194 
The California Supreme Court took the concern of the Missouri 
court one step further, holding that mitigating evidence must consti-
tutionally be presented even if the defendant objects. 195 Although 
speaking in eighth amendment terms, the California court ultimately 
relied on both a statutory theory and an interesting interpretation of 
the sixth amendment to support its requirement of mitigating evi-
dence.196 
In People v. Deere, 191 the defendant pled guilty to one charge of 
first degree murder, two charges of second degree murder, and the 
188. /d. 
189. /d. at 280. 
190. /d. at 278 (citation omitted). 
191. /d. 
192. /d. 
193. /d. at 278, 280. The court indicated that, without the Missouri precedents 
on effective assistance of counsel, it might have rendered a decision that "[gave] 
precedence to the principle of Gregg." /d. at 280. 
194. The court found ineffective assistance of counsel in the guilt phase because 
the trial counsel failed to pursue knowledge that the victim's mother paid two of 
the State's witnesses. /d. at 275. 
195. People v. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d 353, 710 P.2d 925, 222 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1985). 
196. /d. 
197. /d. People v. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d 505, 714 P.2d 1251, 224 Cal. Rptr. 
112 (1986) applied Deere to a similar situation where defendant precluded the 
introduction of any mitigating evidence on his behalf, and his attorney read a 
statement to the jury in which he stated that the defendant wanted to die, and the 
death penalty was imposed. The California court reversed. The State conceded error 
in another post-Deere case, People v. Bloyd, 43 Cal. 3d 333, 729 P .2d 802, 233 
Cal. Rptr. 368 (1987), where defense counsel failed to present mitigating evidence 
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multiple-murder special circumstance.198 The addition of the special 
circumstance199 elevated the charge of first degree murder to capital 
homicide.200 Deere had killed the husband and two daughters of his 
girlfriend's sister. He waived, with the consent of his counsel as 
required by the California Constitution,201 the penalty phase jury. 202 
He offered no evidence of mitigation to the judge.203 Although the 
attorney apparently explained why he acquiesced in his client's wishes, 
he did make an argument to the court that life imprisonment should 
be imposed because aggravating circumstances did not outweigh 
mitigating circumstances.204 The attorney's decision to accede to 
Deere's position was based on his belief that Deere felt that pursuing 
mitigating evidence would "'cheapen' his relationship with his family 
and remove 'the last vestige of dignity he has'" .205 The attorney 
further concluded that he had "no right whatsoever to infringe upon 
[Deere's] decisions about his own life". 206 Deere made a statement 
himself to the court that death was appropriate.207 The trial court 
imposed the death penalty.~ 
California has a mandatory appeal from a sentence of death that 
cannot be waived by the defendant.209 On appeal, Deere's new 
because the defendant "expressly informed [defense counsel) that he didn't want 
this kind of evidence to be presented." 43 Cal. 3d at 364, 729 P .2d at 821, 233 
Cal. Rptr. at 386. 
198. 43 Cal. 3d at 356, 710 P.2d at 926, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 14-15. In California, 
the defense counsel must consent to the plea to a capital charge. CAL. PENAL CoDE 
§ 1018 (West 1985). 
199. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 190.2(a)(3) (West Supp. 1988) was charged in Deere. 
It reads: 
(a) The penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree 
shall be death or confinement in state prison for a term of life without the 
possibility of parole in any case in which one or more of the following 
special circumstances has been charged and specially found under Section 
190.4, to be true: 
(3) The defendant has in this proceeding been convicted of more than one 
offense of murder in the first or second degree. 
200. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20. 
201. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d at 359-60, 710 P.2d at 928, ~22 Cal. Rptr. at 17. CAL. 
CoNST. art. I, § 16 provides: "A jury may be waived in a criminal cause by the 
consent of both parties expressed in open court by the defendant and the defendant's 
counsel." 
202. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d at 357, 710 P.2d at 926, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 15. 
203. /d. 710 P.2d at 926, 222 Cal. Rptr . at 15 
204. /d. at 360-61, 710 P.2d at 929, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 17-18. The attorney 
also told the court that family members were willing to testify on Deere's behalf. 
/d. at 361, 710 P.2d at 929, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 18. 
205. /d. at 361, 710 P.2d at 929, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 18. 
206. /d. 
207. /d. 
208. /d. at 357, 710 P.2d at 926, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 15. 
209. !d.. (citing CAL. PENAL CooE § 1239(b) (West Supp. 1988). See also supra 
text accompanying note 129. 
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attorneys argued, inter alia,210 ineffective assistance of counsel for 
the failure to offer mitigating evidence.211 The California Supreme 
Court affirmed the convictions, but reversed the penalty. 212 
The California court emphasized the public's interest in assuring 
a just punishment.213 The court acknowledged that, if the only 
question were whether a defendant could choose to die, the answer 
would be affirmative.214 However, the court recognized a "funda-
mental public policy against misusing the judicial system to commit 
a state-aided suicide. " 215 The court reasoned that the absence of 
mitigating information before the sentencer also injected unreliability 
into the process of imposing the death penalty. 216 This created the 
spectre of an unconstitutionally arbitrary punishment. 217 Moreover, 
the failure to introduce mitigating evidence left the record blank on 
appeal. 218 The statutorily required appellate review219 also safeguard-
ing the public's interest in assuring a fair trial and just punishment, 
would be meaningless without a record to review. 220 This eighth 
amendment and statutory analysis recognized society's interest, but 
the court still had to solve the question of who should present the 
mitigating evidence. 
The California court found the defense attorney to be the appro-
priate vehicle for introducing the required mitigating evidence.221 The 
court relied on the sixth amendment to hold that Deere had received 
ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to present 
mitigating evidence. 222 The court sidestepped the ethical conflict in 
requiring counsel to present evidence against the defendant's wishes 
by using the concept of an attorney as an "officer of the court. " 223 
This status, according to the court, requires the attorney to bring all 
relevant mitigating information before the court so that the sentencer 
210. The appeal also claimed error in failing to conduct a competency hearing 
and ineffective assistance of counsel in concurring in the waiver of the penalty phase 
jury. The court rejected both of these claims. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d at 357-59, 710 P.2d 
at 926-28, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 15-17. 
211. !d. at 360-61, 710 P.2d at 929, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 17. 
212. !d. at 368, 710 P.2d at 934, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 23. 
213. !d. at 363-64, 710 P.2d at 930-31, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20. 
214. !d. at 361, 710 P.2d at 929, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 18. Suicide is not illegal 
in California, although aiding in a suicide is prohibited. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 401 
(West 1970). 
215. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d at 363, 710 P.2d at 930, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 19. 
216. !d. at 363-64, 710 P.2d at 930-31 , 222 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20. 
217. /d. 
218. !d. 
219. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239(b) (West Supp. 1988). 
220. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d at 363-64, 710 P.2d at 930-31, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 18-
19. 
221. !d. at 366, 710 P.2d at 933, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 21. 
222. !d. at 365, 710 P.2d at 932, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 21. 
223. /d. at 367 n.5, 710 P.2d at 933-34 n.5, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 22 n.5. 
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can fulfill its duty to impose a just sentence.224 The court expressed 
the opinion that the decision of what evidence to put on in the 
penalty phase is the attorney's, not the defendant's. 225 The court 
stated that a reasonable, competent attorney will introduce available 
mitigating evidence. 226 Although acknowledging tactical decisions by 
attorneys to introduce some and exclude other possible mitigating 
evidence, 227 the court found the total abdication in this case unac-
ceptable. The court did not accept the distinction between cases 
where a defendant wants to live and cases where the defendant wants 
to die. 228 In fact, the court cited as authority cases which held there 
had been ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present 
mitigating evidence on behalf of defendants who wanted to live. 229 
Justice Broussard, with whom Justice Grodin joined, concurred 
in the reversal of the penalty on the grounds the defendant did not 
receive a "fair and balanced" hearing, but did not agree with the 
ineffectiveness of counsel grounds.230 Justice Broussard recognized 
224. ld. 
225. /d. at 364, 710 P .2d 931, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 20. The court quotes an 
earlier California case which uses language comparable to the American Bar Asso-
ciation Defense Function definition of the attorney's decisions. Part of the attorney's 
authority under this language is to determine "what witnesses to call." See infra 
text accompanying notes 263-66. · 
226. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d at 364-65, 710 P.2d at 931-32, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 20-
21. 
227. /d. at 364 n.3, 710 P.2d at 931 n.3, 222 CaL Rptr. at 20 n.3. 
228. The court defines the role of counsel without regard to the position of 
the defendant. See id. at 364, 710 P.2d at 93, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 20. 
229. For example, the court cites People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 599 P .2d 
587, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1979), where the defense counsel introduced no mitigating 
evidence but apparently argued for life. The court reversed the conviction on the 
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase. See Deere, 41 Cal. 
3d at 364-65, 710 P.2d at 931-32, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21. 
230. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d at 368-70, 710 P.2d at 934-35, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 23-
24. Justice Lucas similarly disagreed with the majority on the ineffectiveness of 
counsel claim, but would not have found any denial of a fair hearing as in Justice 
Broussard's opinion. /d. at 370-72, 710 P.2d at 935-37, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 24-25. 
Justice Lucas concurred with affirming the convictions, but dissented on reversing 
the penalty. /d. His view was based on the theory that mandating mitigating evidence 
impinged on the defendant's rights to due process, privacy and self-representation. 
/d. at 370, 710 P .2d at 935, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 24. He pointed out that compelling 
evidence against a defendant's wishes may violate his right to represent himself. /d. 
at 371, 710 P.2d at 936, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 25. He expressed the view that the 
reliability of the punishment could be preserved without mitigating evidence by 
"assuring the accuracy of the guilt and penalty determinations .... " /d. at 371-
72, 710 P.2d at 936, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 25. However, he did not explain how the 
accuracy would be safeguarded. /d. at 371-72, 710 P.2d at 936-37, 222 Cal. Rptr. 
at 25. Justice Lucas further noted that Deere's attorney had, in fact, asked for life 
on behalf of Deere. /d. at 371, 710 P.2d at 936, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 25. In his view, 
presenting no mitigating evidence could have conceivably been the result of a strategy 
decision by the attorney to rely on defendant's statement of remorse alone to support 
a plea for life. /d. at 371-72, 710 P.2d at 936-37, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 25. 
126 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
the dilemma in the need for the mitigating evidence to ensure a fair 
sentence and the intrusion into the attorney-client relationship which 
occurs if the defense attorney is required to present evidence in 
contravention of his client's wishes. 231 He suggested several alterna-
tives, including appointing an additional attorney to introduce miti-
gating evidence, permitting the defendant to speak on his own behalf, 
having the court call the mitigating witnesses, and having the defense 
attorney present both defendant's position and the mitigating evi-
dence. 232 These alternatives, he believed, could assure both "the 
fairness and reliability of the penalty determination, and the defen-
dant's rights to personal choice and dignity.' ' 233 
The Appellate Division of a Superior Court of New Jersey has 
also concluded that mitigating evidence must be presented regardless 
of the defendant's position. In State v. Hightower,234 the court 
granted a leave to appeal by the defense attorney after the guilt 
phase of the trial but before the penalty phase. 235 The attorney was 
appealing a ruling by the trial judge that Hightower's refusal to 
present mitigating evidence was conclusive. 236 The attorney wanted 
to present six witnesses to mitigate the circumstances of the crime 
which involved the murder of a grocery store employee during a 
robbery. 237 The court noted the conflict between "the desires of the 
client" and "the constitutional necessity to insure that the ultimate 
penalty is not extracted in a 'wanton and freakish manner.'' ' 238 The 
court made note of the professional conduct rules which would 
require an attorney to further the client's position. 239 Reference was 
also made to Gilmore for the proposition that a defendant could 
waive federal review. 240 Ultimately, however, the New Jersey court 
held that the defense attorney should be permitted to present the 
mitigating evidence in order for the appellate court to conduct a 
meaningful mandatory review of the proportionality of the sen-
tence.241 The individual choice of the defendant has to yield because 
231. /d. at 369, 710 P.2d at 935, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24. "The defense of a 
capital case often requires a close and trusting relationship between counsel and 
client; yet our decision requires counsel to violate that trust, to take a position 
against his client, and perhaps to present evidence revealed to him in confidence by 
his client. " /d. 
232. !d. Ultimately, the trial court in Deere did appoint an attorney whose 
sole purpose was to present mitigating evidence. See infra note 357. 
233. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d at 369, 710 P.2d at 935, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 24. 
234. 214 N.J. Super. 43 , 518 A.2d 482 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986). 
235. /d. at 482. 
236. /d. 
237. /d. 
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"there are higher values at stake here than a defendant's right to 
self-determination. " 242 
The New Jersey court's reasoning is consistent with the rationale 
advanced by the California court that mitigating evidence on the trial 
level is necessary to enable a meaningful mandatory review process. 
Without a record containing mitigating evidence, the courts cannot 
conduct more than a pro forma review of the balance between 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in an individual case. The 
California court's reasoning is broader, however, than the New Jersey 
court's analysis because it explicitly relies on the eighth amendment 
as well. California's decision also has more far-reaching effects on 
the defense attorney's role. The New Jersey court's opinion simply 
provides that the defense attorney in Hightower's case, who wanted 
to present mitigating evidence, must be allowed to do so. There is 
no direct guidance from the New Jersey court on what the trial judge 
should do when the defense attorney believes he or she must accede 
to the defendant's choice to forego mitigating evidence. The Cali-
fornia court in Deere was forced to meet this issue directly since the 
defense attorney refused to present mitigating evidence. 
The reliance on the sixth amendment in Nevada, Louisiana, and 
the Fifth Circuit243 which focuses directly on the defendant's choice 
to forego mitigating evidence in the penalty phase, has resulted in 
permitting death sentences to stand without any guarantee of a non-
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. The courts have correctly 
found that an individual defendant may personally waive sixth 
amendment protections. This is further discussed later as a reason 
why the defense counsel should not be required to present the 
mitigating evidence. However, an exclusive focus on the sixth amend-
ment ignores the importance of the eighth amendment protection of 
the public interest in non-arbitrary imposition of sentences of death. 
The Nevada and Louisiana decisions are examples of the minimization 
of the eighth amendment interest. Those courts held that an individual 
defendant could waive the presentation of mitigating evidence.244 The 
Missouri and Fifth Circuit decisions similarly avoided the eighth 
amendment implications by exclusively addressing the sixth amend-
ment.245 Only the California and New Jersey courts have attempted 
to accommodate both sixth and eighth amendment values. 246 
The eighth amendment values should not be compromised. Per-
mitting a defendant to waive or forego the presentation of mitigating 
evidence defeats the public's interest inherent in the eighth amend-
242. !d. at 484 (quoting Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 468 (1971)). 
243. See supra text accompanying notes 140-73. 
244. !d. 
245. !d. 
246. See supra text accompanying note 198-242. 
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ment. In Furman, the majority of the justices viewed the eighth 
amendment as precluding the imposition of arbitrary punishments.247 
Justices Brennan and Marshall emphasized that the protection of the 
eighth amendment is grounded in preserving the dignity of every 
individual, even those convicted of heinous crimes. 248 The societal 
interest at stake is respect for the criminal justice system and a society 
which only imposes such a severe penalty as death under controlled, 
fair circumstances. The emphasis of the Court since Furman has 
been on the necessity of considering mitigating circumstances of the 
individual defendant as a means of preventing an arbitrary imposition 
of the death penalty.249 Because not all murders warrant death in 
any state, mitigating evidence is necessary to prevent a return to pre-
Furman days. If the defendant waives presentation of mitigating 
evidence, 250 there is no guarantee that there is a meaningful distinction 
between those chosen to live and those chosen to die. 
Limits on an individual defendant's ability to waive constitutional 
rights are warranted when society's interests are balanced against 
those of the defendant. The magnitude of both the societal interest 
and the penalty in capital cases calls for valuing the interest in non-
arbitrariness above the choice of an individual defendant. There is 
no correlative right to choose a penalty. The balancing of interests 
is based on the same analysis engaged in by the Court in Singer in 
requiring the consent of court and counsel to waive a jury.251 The 
fairness of the proceeding is paramount to the defendant's free 
choice. 252 Constitutional protections are maintained by affording a 
defendant the consideration of mitigating evidence just as constitu-
24 7. See supra text accompanying notes 41-45. 
248. Justice Brennan states: "The State, even as it punishes, must treat its 
members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human beings." Furman, 408 U.S. 
at 270. 
Justice Marshall states: "The criminal acts with which we are confronted are ugly, 
vicious, reprehensible acts. Their sheer brutality cannot and should not be minimized. 
But, we are not called upon to condone the penalized conduct; we are asked only 
to examine the penalty imposed ... and to determine whether or not it violates the 
Eighth Amendment." !d. at 315. More recently, in Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 
2595, 2600 (1986), Justice Marshall, speaking for the majority which held it uncon-
stitutional to execute a defendant who is presently insane, stated that the Court 
must determine "whether a particular punishment comports with the fundamental 
human dignity that the Amendment protects." 
249. See supra text accompanying notes 50-65. 
250. The Court has recognized instances where the defendant and his or her 
attorney have made a tactical decision not to present mitigating evidence at the 
penalty proceeding. However, the tactical decision was based on believing the jury 
would be more likely to find mitigating circumstances outweighing aggravating 
circumstances on the basis of evidence already heard. See Darden v. Wainwright, 
106 S. Ct. 2464 (1986). 
251. 380 u.s. 34, 36 (1965). 
252. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86. 
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tional protections are furthered by affording a defendant a jury. The 
Supreme Court's strong protection of the right to present mitigating 
evidence reflects its recognition that the eighth amendment safeguards 
are preserved primarily through a factual presentation.253 As in a 
rejected plea bargain, there is no factual basis on which the death 
penalty may be imposed without consideration of mitigating as well 
as aggravating circumstances. 
Moreover, courts in states with a mandatory review of capital 
sentences have totally precluded a waiver of the appeal by the 
defendant largely on the basis of the public interest at stake.254 
Although these courts had a statutory basis on which to rely in lieu 
of a constitutional theory, the balancing of society's interests against 
the interest of an individual defendant was still the central issue.m 
Permitting a waiver of the presentation of mitigating evidence at the 
trial level not only precludes a meaningful review by an appellate 
court, but strips the criminal justice system of any possibility of 
guaranteeing non-arbitrariness in determining who dies. This is tan-
tamount to permitting the waiver of an appellate review. 
Mitigating evidence is crucial precisely because it is presented at 
the trial level. Society's interest in preventing arbitrary imposition of 
the death penalty can be protected most effectively at the trial level. 
It is in the trial court where evidence is heard; and where the 
factfinder makes judgments from observation of witnesses. The ap-
pellate process is a review of alleged errors of law, not a factfinding 
process. The judgments of an appellate tribunal are of necessity 
limited to the record. Where society's interest is met by an affirmative 
consideration of mitigating facts, the proceedings in the trial court 
are critical to effective protection of that interest. 
The practical dilemma is deciding who should present the evidence 
of mitigating circumstances. Because the most likely candidate is the 
defendant's attorney, issues of both professional ethics and consti-
tutional considerations of effective assistance of counsel arise. The 
next section focuses on 1) whether professional ethical obligations 
permit or require a defense attorney to present mitigating evidence 
over the objection of the defendant and 2) whether the defendant is 
denied effective assistance of counsel if the defense attorney fails to 
present mitigation in accordance with the defendant's wishes. 
253. See supra text accompanying notes 50-65. 
254. See supra text accompanying notes 120-33. 
255. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 383 A.2d 174, 181 
(1978) (waiver is not designed to block giving effect to a strong public interest which 
is itself a jurisprudential concern; waiver is not a means for allowing defendant to 
choose his own sentence); Judy v. State, 275 Ind. 145, 416 N.E.2d 95 (1981); People 
v. Stanworth 71 Cal. 2d 820, 457 P.2d 889, 80 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1969) (state has an 
interest which the defendant cannot extinguish). 
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IV. SHOULD THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY PRESENT 
MITIGATING EVIDENCE? 
A. Professional Ethics Considerations 
[Vol. 55 
An attorney is bound to follow the ethical principles established 
by the legal profession. Each state has adopted its own code of 
professional ethics. Most256 follow some version of the American Bar 
Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 257 The 
American Bar Association recently adopted a new code, the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct. 258 The ABA has also promulgated 
Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice which 
include a section on the role of the criminal defense attorney, entitled 
The Defense Function. 259 Although individual states may vary in 
adoption of these rules,260 the ABA standards provide an overall view 
of the underlying ethical values and obligations involved in repre-
senting a criminal defendant. The criminal defense attorney's obli-
gations to a client who wishes to forego mitigating evidence will thus 
be analyzed using the ABA guidelines. 
Three interrelated ethical concerns arise when the defendant wants 
to forego mitigating evidence. First, to what extent are decisions 
regarding tactics and the presentation of evidence the defendant's? 
Second, as a "zealous advocate," what is the attorney's obligation 
to the defendant? Third, is the obligation to represent one's client 
zealously tempered to any extent by virtue of the lawyer's status as 
an "officer of the court"? Although the language varies in the two 
Codes and the Defense Function, the principles are the same. The 
attorney's ethical obligations compel allegiance to the client's decision 
whether or not to present mitigating evidence. 
The thrust of the ethical guidelines requires an attorney to abide 
by the client's decisions on the goals of the representation. Although 
the attorney maintains control of how to present the client's case, it 
is the client who determines the objectives. The Model Rules explicitly 
provide that an attorney must accept the client's choice of goals: 
"[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objec-
tives of representation . . . and shall consult with the client as to the 
means by which they are to be pursued. " 261 The ABA Code states 
256. Over forty states adopted a version of the ABA Code. See THE LAWYER's 
HANDBOOK A1-2 (1975). 
257. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979). 
258. The model rules were adopted August 1983 by the ABA. 
259. The standards were approved in 1979. 
260. See, e.g., Mo. SuP. CT. R . 4; TEx. STAT. ANN. § 8 (Vernon 1973). 
261. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.2 (1983). This obligation 
is subject to three qualifications: that the objectives may be limited if the client 
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the same obligation by providing that the lawyer may decide non-
substantive matters and courses to take, but that the ultimate deci-
sions on matters affecting the merits belong to the client. 262 
Unfortunately, the ethical codes inadequately define what consti-
tutes an "objective" or a decision on the "merits." The only specific 
examples that the ABA Code gives are the client's decisions on what 
plea to enter and whether to take an appeal. 263 The Model Rules, 
following the standards of The Defense Function, state that it is the 
defendant's decision "as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive 
jury trial and whether the client will testify. " 264 The Defense Function 
lists certain decisions that are exclusively the attorney's, such as 
"what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-exami-
nation, what jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should be 
made, and all other strategic and tactical decisions .... " 265 No 
examples are given of a decision on the merits or of an objective in 
a sentencing context. The Defense Function merely provides that an 
attorney must advise the defendant of the alternatives and their 
consequences as well as presenting any information "favorable" to 
the defendant. 266 
The decision to pursue a life sentence or to acquiesce in the death 
penalty is properly made by the defendant. This decision establishes 
consents; that no criminal or fraudulent activity is condoned; and that the client be 
told if the expected assistance cannot be ethically or legally pursued by the lawyer. 
!d. at (c)-(e). Although the comments to this rule again reiterate that "[t]he client 
has ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, 
within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional obligations," it also 
states without much explanation "[a]t the same time, a lawyer is not required to 
pursue objectives or employ means simply because a client may wish that the lawyer 
do so." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2, Comments (1983). I 
doubt that the drafters of the rules envisioned a lawyer superseding his or her client 
on a fundamental question such as guilt or innocence, life or death. 
262. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSffiiLITY EC 7-7 (1979): "In certain 
areas of legal representation not affecting the merits of the cause or substantially 
prejudicing the rights of a client, a lawyer is entitled to make decisions on his own. 
But otherwise the authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the client and, 
if made within the framework of the law, such decisions are binding on his lawyer." 
263. !d. 
264. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.2 (1983); ABA STAN· 
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARD 4-5.2 (Approved 
1979). It has been argued that the list of client decisions in The Defense Function 
is exhaustive. Trimble v. State, 693 S.W.2d 267, 279 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). This 
does not seem likely in light of the more general statements regarding client 
determination of objectives in the main body of rules. Moreover, THE DEFENSE 
FUNCTION STANDARD 4-3.1(b) states: "[t]he technical and professional decisions must 
rest with the lawyer without impinging on the right of the accused to make the 
ultimate decisions on certain specified matters, as delineated in [4-5.2 quoted in the 
text]". 
265. The Defense Function Standards 4-5.2(b). 
266. The Defense Function Standard 4-8.1. 
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the objective of the penalty phase as certainly as a decision in a 
noncapital trial to plead, to waive a jury, or to testify is a decision 
on the merits . Although the defense counsel may decide whether to 
present witnesses in the penalty phase of a capital case, that tactical 
decision must be based on furthering the client's chosen course of 
action. Even when the client may be making a substantive decision 
on a legal alternative which is counter to the attorney's better legal 
advice, the client's decision is final. The ABA Code voices this when 
it states: "the lawyer should always remember that the decision 
whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because of 
non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself. " 267 
It would not be consistent to interpret The Defense Function's 
language requiring presentation of information "favorable" to the 
defendant to support presentation of evidence in favor of life when 
the defendant chooses death. "Favorable" undoubtedly is meant to 
refer to bettering the defendant's position and assumes the defendant 
wants the least sentence possible. Moreover, The Defense Function 
itself is a more specialized description of an attorney's role under 
the Codes. Where the Codes' major proposition is that the attorney 
should advocate the defendant's decisions on the merits, it is only 
logical to interpret The Defense Function consistently with the prem-
ise. The attorney's role then is to further the defendant's objective 
of obtaining the death penalty. 
The obligation to present a client's case as effectively as possible 
further compels the attorney's allegiance to the client's position on 
a substantive issue. The lawyer's role as advocate is essential to the 
functioning of an adversary system of justice.268 This role is com-
monly expressed as being a "zealous advocate" for the client.269 An 
attorney may even encounter ethical problems by failing to present 
267. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1983). 
268. !d. at EC 7-19. This ethical consideration speaks of the role of the lawyer 
in an adversary system. It provides: 
An adversary presentation counters the natural human tendency to judge 
too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known; the 
advocate, by his zealous preparation and presentation of facts and law, 
enables the tribunal to come to the hearing with an open and neutral mind 
and to render impartial judgments. The duty of a lawyer to his client and 
his duty to the legal system are the same: to represent his client zealously 
within the bounds of the law. 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-23 further provides that "[t]he 
adversary system contemplates that each lawyer will present and argue the existing 
law in the light most favorable to his client. 
269. THE MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1983) states 
"[t]he duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent 
his client zealously within the bounds of the law .... " The Preamble to the newer 
Model Rules provides that "[a]s advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's 
position under the rules of the adversary system." 
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available evidence furthering the client's position. ABA Code Disci-
plinary Rule 7-101 prohibits a lawyer from intentionally failing "to 
seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available 
means ... . " 270 This command is softened by subsection B of 7-101 
which releases the lawyer from this obligation where the anticipated 
conduct is unlawful or "where permissible. " 271 If the defense attorney 
is required to present mitigating evidence, he or she arguably acts 
unethically not only for failing to advocate the defendant's position 
of death, but also for affirmatively opposing the defendant's posi-
tion.272 
An attorney has the additional responsibility of preserving the 
confidences of the client.273 There are very few circumstances in 
which an attorney may reveal such confidences. For example, the 
Model Rules provide for disclosure only to prevent a crime likely to 
cause death or substantial bodily harm or to defend against a claim 
by the client relating to the attorney's conduct.274 If the defense 
attorney in a capital case must present mitigating evidence in dero-
gation of the client's choice, it is inevitable that some of the infor-
mation directly or indirectly will be derived from statements made 
by the defendant to the attorney in confidence. By presenting miti-
gating evidence based on that information, the attorney is then 
revealing confidential information without the consent of the client. 
Unless a new category for mandatory or permissible revelation of a 
client's confidence is created, the attorney is presented with an ethical 
dilemma.275 Once again the ethical guidelines pose an obstacle to a 
system which requires the attorney to present mitigating evidence in 
cases where the defendant chooses to die . 
Could the defense attorney be required to present mitigating 
evidence against the defendant's wishes because the attorney is an 
"officer of the court"? The idea that an attorney is an "officer of 
270. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSWILITY DR 7-101. 
271. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSWILITY DR 7-101(8). 
272. This apparently was the attorney's position in People v. Deere where 
upon remand he still refused to present mitigating evidence. See infra text accom-
panying note 356. 
273. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1986); MODEL 
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSWILITY Canon 4 (1970). 
274. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.6(b) (1981); The ABA 
Code provides for discretionary disclosure where the client consents; disclosure is 
required under disciplinary rules, court order, or by law; it is necessary for prevention 
of crime; and in the attorney's defense against misconduct claims or affirmatively 
to collect fees . MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSWILITY DR 4-101 (1970). 
275. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSWILITY DR 4-101 (1970) requires 
the preservation of confidences and secrets, a confidence being information protected 
by the attorney-client privilege, and a secret being any information gained in the 
relationship either requested by the client to be held confidential or disclosure of 
which would be embarrassing or detrimental. 
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the court" is inherent in our legal system, although the term is not 
used specifically to impose an obligation on the attorney in the 
professional conduct rules. The ABA Code does not use the term. 
The Model Rules, in its Preamble, refer to the lawyer as "an officer 
of the legal system. " 276 The Defense Function addresses the need to 
be respectful of the court because the attorney is an officer of the 
court.277 
What are the ramifications of being an officer of the court? The 
term is primarily applied when an attorney is disciplined or criticized 
for unprofessional conduct.278 It is derived from common law and 
connotes the high standards an attorney must maintain while pursuing 
his or her client's interests.279 A typical aspirational use of the term 
by the Supreme Court is found in Hickman v. Taylor:280 "Histori-
cally, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work for 
the advancement of jus£ice while faithfully protecting the rightful 
interests of his clients. "~• Except to the extent of prohibiting an 
attorney from perpetrating a fraud upon the court, such as through 
testimony known to the attorney to be perjured, 282 the standards of 
professional conduct do not place an affirmative burden on an 
attorney regarding the content of a case. 283 Thus, the concept of an 
attorney as an officer of the court is a regulatory one. It is not 
designed to interfere with the representation of a client except for 
certain prohibitions, such as subornation of perjury, which offend 
the integrity of the judicial process.284 
276. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONS!BniTY Preamble (1970). 
277. THE DEFENSE FuNCTION Standard 4-7. I. 
278. See, e.g .. State v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 833, 394 P.2d 681, 684 
(1964) (attorney as an officer of the court should not be a depository for criminal 
evidence and should turn over the evidence to the prosecution); Ex porte Wall, 107 
U.S. 265, 274 (1882) (disbarment for leading, advising, and encouraging the lynching 
of a prisoner upheld-Wall's action, for an officer of the court, manifested a "want 
of fidelity to the system of lawful government"). The Preamble to the Model Code 
speaks of the self-governing nature of the legal professions, where the courts 
ultimately regulate the profession. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONS!BU.ITY 
Preamble (1970). 
279. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 724 n.l4 (1973). 
280. 329 u.s. 495 (1945). 
281. /d. at 510. 
282. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONS!BLITY DR 7-102(A)(4) (1970). 
MoDEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1981). 
283. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmniTY DR 7-102 (1970) also 
prohibits advancing suits for harassment purposes or claims and defenses unsup-
portable in law or engaging in any other conduct in violation of the Disciplinary 
Rules. However, these do not, potentially, dictate the contents of the lawsuits to 
the extent prohibiting evidence does. 
284. Also in keeping with a regulatory purpose, although an affirmative 
obligation, was requiring an attorney to represent a criminal defendant. Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (attorneys are officers of the court and are bound 
to render service when appointed by the court to do so). 
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It would be blazing new trails to use the officer of the court 
concept to impose a duty on an attorney to present evidence which 
is not in the client's interest. 285 For example, suppose the client's 
goal is seeking acquittal. Introducing perjured testimony in pursuit 
of that goal would be an inappropriate means to that end. In contrast, 
failure to introduce mitigating evidence in furtherance of a goal of 
gaining imposition of the death penalty is not an inappropriate means. 
Although it might be possible to argue that death is not a legitimate 
goal, a majority of the Supreme Court has approved of this penalty 
under certain conditions. The ethical constraints and aspirations for 
lawyers thus cannot be rationalized with an obligation to present 
mitigating evidence in contravention of the defendant's legitimate 
position. 
The adversary system is adversely impacted if an attorney must 
conduct him or herself other than as a loyal advocate for a legitimate 
position of the defendant. To present evidence against the objectives 
of the defendant creates ethical problems for the attorney in zealously 
representing the client and in preserving confidentiality of commu-
nications. The attorney is compromised by a conflict of interest 
between the duty owed to the client and the duty owed to the court. 
The Model Rules address the situation where a lawyer has a conflict 
with another client, a third person, or the lawyer's own interests.286 
The exception to barring a lawyer from representing the client under 
these conditions arises only when the lawyer has a reasonable belief 
that the client will not be adversely affected and the client consents 
to continued representation.287 Neither condition is likely to be met 
when the defendant wishes to preclude mitigating evidence. The 
attorney's loyalty is split between the court, as a third person, and 
the client. Although one could argue that the client is not adversely 
affected by his attorney arguing for his life, we are still confronted 
with the issue of an attorney advocating a position diametrically 
opposed to his client. Moreover, in cases where a defendant decides 
to acquiesce in death, consent is not forthcoming.288 These divisions 
285. THE DEFENSE FuNCTION Standard 4-1.6 provides: "The duties of a lawyer 
to a client are to represent the client's legitimate interests .... " Similarly, MonEL 
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1970) states that each person is 
entitled "to seek any lawful objective through legally permissible means; and to 
present for adjudication any lawful claim, issue, or defense." EC 7-9 also states 
that "a lawyer should always act in a manner consistent with the best interests of 
his client." 
286. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1981). 
287. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b)(l-2) (1981). See also 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(8) (1977). 
288. See supra text accompanying notes 177-78 (the continuous efforts of 
Trimble to end all efforts on his behalf). 
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of the attorney's loyalties and responsibilities are anathema to the 
attorney-client relationship. 289 
Without a massive overhaul of the professional ethical rules and 
our perception of the role of a defense attorney in an adversary 
system of justice, the defense counsel should be precluded from 
advocating life by presenting mitigating evidence against the defen-
dant's wishes. The argument has been advanced that a defendant is 
denied the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel when 
the defense attorney fails to introduce mitigating evidence, despite 
the defendant's adamant position rejecting such evidence. The next 
section considers the constitutional issue. 
B. Effective Assistance of Counsel 
The right to counsel, and effective counsel, not only stems from 
the sixth amendment but also from other constitutional provisions. 
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... 
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. " 290 Its terms are 
applicable to the States through the fourteenth amendment.291 The 
right to an attorney, retained or appointed, applies after the initiation 
of adversary proceedings. 292 This right continues through the sen-
tencing of the defendant.293 Prior to the application of the sixth 
amendment to the states, the United States Supreme Court held that 
defendants had a right to appointed counsel in a capital case pursuant 
to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in order to 
289. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1981) comment reflects 
this concern: "Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a 
client." Similarly MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-l (1970) states: 
"The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of 
the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and 
loyalties." Although the Disciplinary Rules do not specifically address this situation, 
DR 5-105 (B) prohibits representation in light of a conflict between two clients 
unless the attorney is capable of adequately representing each interest and has the 
consent of each party. This type of procedure, requiring the attorney to act counter 
to his or her client's interests, reflects the standards which pertain to an ex parte 
proceeding. The Model Rules, for example, provide that in such a proceeding, "(a] 
lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which 
will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are 
adverse." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(d) (1981). 
290. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
291. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963). 
292. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-89 (1984). The adversary 
proceedings are usually initiated by an information or an indictment, although 
arraignment on an arrest warrant has also been considered sufficient. Brewer v. 
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977). 
293. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134, 137 (1967). 
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ensure the fundamental fairness of the trial.294 Where the Constitution 
does not guarantee assistance of counsel, the Court has at times used 
a due process or equal protection theory to find a right to appointed 
counsel.295 The right to an attorney on the first appeal by right, not 
guaranteed by the sixth amendment, is an example of a fourteenth 
amendment guarantee. Because the issue of effectiveness of counsel 
in the penalty phase involves the trial stage, it is the sixth amend-
ment's guarantees that the courts have addressed. 296 
How do we judge effective assistance of counsel? Prior to the 
1984 Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Cronic297 and 
Strickland v. Washington,298 courts struggled to find an appropriate 
standard. Cronic and Strickland approved the use of two approaches, 
depending on the type of alleged ineffective assistance. The Court 
distinguished cases where the right to counsel is infringed by an error 
that pervades the entire trial, such as actual or constructive denial 
of counsel or conflict of interest,299 from cases where the error alleged 
is incompetence in the actual performance by the attorney.300 In the 
former cases of pervasive error, the Court set forth a categorical, 
per se error standard for failures to meet specific duties. In such 
cases, a defendant need not show any prejudice resulting from the 
error. 301 In cases regarding an attorney's performance, the Court 
established a judgmental, two-pronged test.302 The first prong applies 
a reasonable objective standard ·of whether the attorney's actions 
were outside the range of a competent attorney.303 If the attorney's 
conduct falls outside of the range of competence, the defendant must 
meet the second prong, a showing of prejudice defined as a "rea-
sonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. " 304 
294. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69-70 (1932). 
295. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-58 (1963). The Court has not 
extended this to further appeals. Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 589 (1982); 
Ross v. Moffitt , 417 U.S. 600, 606-608 (1974). 
296. See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464 (1986); Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
297. 466 u.s. 648 (1984). 
298. 466 u.s. 668 (1984). 
299. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 nn.25, 26. "The Court has uniformly found 
constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when counsel was either totally 
absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the 
proceeding." !d. at 659 n.25 (citations omitted). Conflict of interest was further 
addressed in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 
344 (1980)) (actual conflict of interest adversely affecting lawyer's performance 
renders assistance ineffective). 
300. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 
301. Cronic, 466 U .S. at 659; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. 
302. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
303. Jd. 
304. !d. at 694. The Court specifically denies that this test is an outcome-
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In Cronic, the Court held that the per se approach was improperly 
applied where the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel 
involved the attorney's lack of time to prepare and lack of trial 
experience in a complex "check-kiting" case.305 This type of situation, 
according to the Court, did not rise to the level of a presumptively 
unreliable proceeding.306 The Court did not address specific alleged 
errors in performance which would call for a judgmental approach. 307 
The case was remanded to the lower court to determine whether the 
two prong analysis for performance errors was met.308 
In Strickland, the Court applied the two prong test to assess an 
attorney's conduct during the penalty phase of a capital trial. 309 In 
the Court's view, the role of counsel was comparable in both trial 
and capital sentencing procedures "to ensure that the adversarial 
testing process works to produce a just result under the standards 
governing decision. " 310 The defendant in that case pled guilty to 
three capital murder charges and waived Florida's advisory jury in 
the penalty phase.311 At the time of his plea, the defendant told the 
judge he had "no significant prior criminal record" and that he had 
been under extreme emotional distress from failing to support his 
farnily. 312 His attorney presented no evidence at the penalty hearing 
before the judge, but did argue for his client's life. 313 The Court 
found that the reliance on the defendant's statements to the judge 
when entering his plea314 was a competent strategy decision.315 Evi-
dence of a more extensive criminal record than alluded to by the 
defendant and possibly adverse psychiatric testimony could not be 
presented by the State as a result of the attorney's tactic. 316 The 
determinative standard or means that the outcome more likely than not would have 
been different. !d. A "reasonable probability" is defined as "a probability sufficient 
to undermine confidence in the outcome." /d. 
305. Defense counsel, a real estate attorney with no jury experience, was given 
twenty-five days to prepare for trial. !d. at 649. 
306. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 666 n.40. 
307. !d. at 666. 
308. /d. 
309. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700. 
310. !d. at 687. 
311. /d. at 672. 
312. /d. 
313. !d. at 674. 
314. /d. at 677. The plea would have been handled on a different day, possibly 
even weeks, before the penalty hearing. /d. 
315. /d. at 699. 
316. /d. at 700. Besides not introducing evidence or putting the defendant on 
the stand, the attorney also did not request a pre-sentence report. Evidence from 
that source or from the State was thus precluded. /d. at 676. There was also an 
allegation of a failure to investigate in the attorney's failure to follow up on a 
meeting with the defendant's wife and mother. /d. at 672-73. The attorney also 
apparently relied upon the reputation of the judge as one who was more lenient 
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Court further found that the defendant would also fail to meet the 
second prong of Strickland because there was no "reasonable prob-
ability" that mitigating circumstances would have outweighed the 
aggravating circumstances. 317 
The basis of the Court's opinions is that effective counsel is 
needed in order to ensure the fundamental fairness of a trial. Justice 
O'Connor, writing for the majority in Strickland, stated: 
The sixth amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel 
because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the 
ability of the adversarial system to produce just results. An accused 
is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or ap-
pointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is 
fair. 318 
The Court repeatedly stressed the need to judge whether a breakdown 
in the adversarial process, of which an attorney is an integral part, 
had caused an unjust result. 319 The Court in Strickland, however, 
was not facing the issue of a calculated effort to preclude the 
consideration of mitigating circumstances. 
The Court's emphasis on the fairness of the trial through a right 
to counsel creates analytical. confusion in defining the role of the 
defense attorney. It becomes a viable argument that a procedure 
which is fundamentally unfair because it lacks adversarial input 
violates the sixth amendment. Thus, the California court in People 
v. Deere reasoned that the failure to consider mitigating evidence 
when defendants accepted responsibility for their actions, which the defendant had 
done at the time of his plea. /d. In fact, the attorney argued, because the defendant 
had surrendered and confessed, he should be given life. /d. at 673. The Court found 
all of these decisions to be within the range of a competent strategy decision. !d. 
at 699. 
317. !d. at 699-700. The specific question to answer with regard to the penalty 
phase of a capital case under this analysis was "whether there is a reasonable 
probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer ... would have concluded that the 
balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death." The 
aggravating factors found by the judge pursuant to the Florida statutory scheme 
were 1) the murders were "especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel"; 2) the murders 
occurred during the course of a "dangerous and violent" felony; 3) the murders 
were committed for "pecuniary gain"; and 4) the murders were committed "to 
avoid arrest for the other crimes [kidnapping, extortion and theft]". /d. at 674, 
675. The judge also found none of Florida's statutorily prescribed mitigating factors, 
except the lack of prior criminal conduct. /d. at 674-75. 
318. !d. at 685. 
319. /d. at 684-86, 696. Justice Marshall, in dissent, did not focus on the 
result. He asserted that the right to effective counsel not only safeguards the innocent 
from conviction but also ensures fundamentally fair procedures leading to a convic-
tion. He stated that "[a] proceeding in which the defendant does not receive 
meaningful assistance in meeting the forces of the state does not, in my opinion, 
constitute due process." /d. at 711 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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made the proceeding fundamentally unfair. 320 Because this evidence 
is ordinarily introduced by the defense counsel, the California court 
logically concluded that this lack of evidence was due to ineffective 
assistance of counsel, regardless of the defendant's position that no 
such evidence be presented. However, a sixth amendment analysis 
will not lead to the conclusion of ineffective assistance of counsel 
under either the per se error or the two-pronged approach. 
The problem with using the per se approach is the defendant not 
only has an attorney, but also has one advocating the defendant's 
legitimate position. Although the Court has stressed the reliability of 
the proceedings as the basis for the sixth amendment,321 and an 
argument can be made that sentencing is unreliable without mitigating 
evidence, the unreliability is not due to a violation of the right to 
counsel. To raise a sixth amendment issue, the unreliability must 
stem from the court's interference with the attorney's representation 
and not from the defendant's decision.322 Thus, if a defendant wants 
all mitigating evidence introduced and the court refuses to appoint 
an attorney to represent the defendant or refuses to allow the attorney 
to present the evidence, there would be a denial of the right to 
effective counsel as a means of participation in the adversary sys-
tem.323 When the defendant opposes the introduction of mitigating 
evidence and his attorney accedes to this decision, one would have 
to argue that a complete denial of the assistance of counsel occurs 
where an attorney assists the defendant in his chosen objective. Yet, 
the court has properly provided counsel for the defendant and the 
attorney has represented the position of the defendant. If there is no 
error in either the court's or the state's actions in interfering with 
representation, or no conflict of interest for the defense attorney, 
there can be no per se error under the sixth amendment. 324 
Similarly, no sixth amendment violation exists under the two-
prong Strickland test for attorney performance. The first prong is 
not met. It is not outside the range of competent attorney actions 
to fail to present mitigating evidence when the defendant adamantly 
endorses that position. In order to find incompetent conduct, the 
attorney would have to be under a duty to present mitigating evidence 
320. People v. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d 353,710 P.2d 925,222 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1985). 
321. See supra text accompanying notes 318-19. 
322. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). 
323. The Court in Strickland states that " [t]he right to counsel plays a crucial 
role in the adversarial system embodied in the Sixth Amendmant, since access to 
counsel's skill and knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the 'ample oppor-
tunity to meet the case of the prosecution' to which they are entitled." 466 U.S. at 
685; quoting Adams v. United States ex rei. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275-76 (1942). 
324. This situation is simply not analogous to cases where an attorney has a 
conflict of interest or is precluded from effective cross-examination. See, e.g., Cuyler 
v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
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regardless of the defendant's view. 325 If such a duty exists pursuant 
to the sixth amendment, it will conflict with the ethical considerations 
of representing the defendant's objectives previously discussed. Al-
though the Supreme Court has indicated that it separates the sixth 
amendment issue from state ethical rules,326 the Court's cases on 
effective assistance of counsel reflect its view that the essence of the 
attorney's role under the sixth amendment is identical to the role 
described in the ethical rules. 327 The attorney is to function as a loyal 
advocate of the defendant's chosen objectives. 328 
The Court repeatedly emphasized the attorney's advocacy role. 
In Strickland, for example, Justice O'Connor, writing for the ma-
jority, noted that an attorney's actions are based on the informed 
choices of the defendant. 329 In reiterating the principle that there is 
ineffective assistance of counsel justifying a presumption of prejudice 
when an attorney has a conflict of interest in representing a defen-
dant, she noted that "[i]n those circumstances, counsel breaches the 
duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties."330 When 
discussing the need to defer to attorney judgments, Justice O'Connor 
also commented that too great a scrutiny of attorney performance 
could "undermine the trust between attorney and client. " 331 In Cronic, 
the majority quoted with approval a similar statement by Justice 
Brennan: '"To satisfy the Constitution, counsel must function as an 
advocate for the defendant, as opposed to a friend of the court. "'332 
The Court further noted in Cronic that "the Sixth Amendment does 
325. Certainly where there is no conflict with the defendant's chosen course 
of action, a failure to present any mitigating evidence without a tactical reason to 
withhold the evidence should be deemed incompetent representation. See, e.g., Blake 
v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523 (I Ith Cir. 1985); Pickens v. Lockhart, 714 F.2d 1455 (8th 
Cir. 1983). 
326. See, e.g, Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988, 994 (1986). The Nix Court 
stated: 
!d. 
Under the Strickland standard, breach of an ethical standard does not 
necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of 
assistance of counsel. When examining attorney conduct, a court must be 
careful not to narrow the wide -range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth 
Amendment so restrictively as to constitutionalize particular standards of 
professional conduct and thereby intrude into the State's proper authority 
to define and apply the standards of professional conduct applicable to 
those it admits to practice in its courts. 
327. See supra notes 268-72 and accompanying text. 
328. See discussion of the role of counsel in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 
656 & nn.l5-19. 
329. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984). 
330. !d. at 692. 
331. /d. at 690. 
332. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 n.l7 (1984) (quoting Jones v. 
Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 758 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
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not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. " 333 In 
light of the Court's view of counsel's role under the sixth amendment, 
it does not seem plausible to interpret the sixth amendment to require 
the defense attorney to present mitigating evidence against his client's 
wishes.334 
The attorney's decisions must be given great deference in a sixth 
amendment analysis. Thus, the attorney's decision not to present 
mitigating evidence will be treated as presumptively competent under 
Strickland's test. 335 In Strickland, the Court noted that "[t]here are 
countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even 
the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular 
client in the same way.' ' 336 Given this deference to the defense 
attorney, 337 it does not seem likely that the Court will be receptive 
to interpreting the sixth amendment guarantee of a fair trial to 
prohibit a strategy of failing to introduce evidence in accordance 
with a defendant's wishes or, as a corollary, to mandate a strategy 
of presenting evidence in contravention of the defendant's position. 
Although the sixth amendment is inapplicable in this context, 
mitigating evidence must be presented to meet eighth amendment 
guarantees. The trial court, however, is still faced with a dilemma. 
If the defense attorney fails to present the evidence, he or she is 
following the ethical requirements of representing the defendant. 
Without the mitigating evidence, however, there is a breakdown in 
the protections designed to ensure the non-arbitrary application of 
the death penalty. The final section addresses the trial court's di-
lemma and proposes a solution. 
V. ACCOMMODATING THE NEED FOR MITIGATING EVIDENCE 
AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 
The criminal justice system is troubled with many difficult ques-
tions involving the death penalty. It is an onerous burden to devise 
333. !d . at 656 n.l9. This of course raises an interesting question whether any 
state bar would or could discipline an attorney for being an effective attorney for 
constitutional purposes but not for ABA purposes. 
334. See also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983). In Jones the Court found 
that the attorney's tactical decision to brief only the best issues on appeal and to 
exclude certain issues that defendant wanted raised did not amount to ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Justice Blackmun took the view that an attorney ethically 
must argue all nonfrivolous issues on appeal urged by the defendant , but a breach 
of that duty did not amount, under the circumstances of Jones, to a sixth amendmant 
violation. !d. at 754-55 (Blackmun, J. concurring). 
335. See infra note 337. 
336. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). 
337. In Strickland, the Court stated: "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's perform-
ance must be highly deferential." !d. The Court further stated it would apply "a 
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance," a presumption the defendant must overcome. !d. 
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a system where imposition of the ultimate penalty of death is done 
in a non-arbitrary manner. Victims' rights, defendants' rights, strain 
on court time and resources, and underlying moral questions are all 
part of the equation which the judicial scales must balance.338 The 
fundamental question which can never be escaped is who should live 
and who should die. 
While no one resolution of the question of who lives and who 
dies will ever satisfy all diverse interest groups, the judicial system 
cannot afford to subordinate the integrity of the process to a result 
desired by a vocal segment of society. The Supreme Court recognized 
the critical need for impeccable integrity in the decision making 
process in capital cases throughout the post-Furman years when the 
Court began to uphold statutory schemes with multiple safeguards 
against arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. Every case empha-
sized the necessity of considering mitigating evidence about the 
individual defendant in a specific case.339 Mandatory death penalty 
statutes were declared unconstitutional. 340 Implicit was the idea that 
no person could be put to death unless it was deemed to be the 
appropriate punishment because aggravating circumstances out-
weighed mitigating circumstances for this defendant. 
Some defendants want no efforts made on behalf of life. One 
may be tempted to say that an individual who is accused of a brutal 
murder can accede to death as the appropriate punishment. One 
argument advanced is that any capital murderer deserves to die;341 
therefore, why not kill those murderers the jury has condemned as 
well as those murderers who save us the trouble of impaneling the 
jury. 
Problems arise, however, when the system of justice is scrutinized 
to determine if justice is in fact being dispensed evenhandedly. For 
example, most state statutes would characterize a murder intentionally 
committed during the course of a robbery as a capital offense. 342 To 
say that all defendants convicted of such a murder shall die, appears 
evenhanded on the surface. However, most would agree a 30-year-
338. Moreover, the toll on the attorneys who give of their training, skill, and 
emotions in representing an individual accused of a heinous crime is often over-
looked. These attorneys face a herculean task in preparing, trying, and appealing 
capital cases. 
339. See supra discussion of cases in text accompanying notes 50-65. 
340. See supra text accompanying note 56. 
341. See Van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARv. L. 
REv. 1662, 1663 (1986) (arguing that it is appropriate to execute an individual 
whether or not others similiarly situated are given life imprisonment). Van de Haag's 
argument ignores the reality of our system and the moral values underlying the legal 
concepts of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. See Greenberg, Against the 
American System of Capital Punishment, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1670, 1678-79 (1986). 
342. See supra text accompanying note 16. 
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old, recidivist defendant who demands money, forces the victim to 
lie face down on the floor, and then executes the victim with a bullet 
in the back of the head is more culpable than a 17-year-old defendant 
who demands money, panics, and then fires a gun. Imposing the 
death penalty on both of these defendants solely on the basis that 
each has been convicted of the same statutory elements of the crime 
is an approach rejected by the Supreme Court. 343 
The determination of life or death is dependent upon the balance 
between aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances for 
a particular defendant. If a defendant refuses to present mitigating 
evidence, the critical safeguard of individual case-by-case determi-
nation of the appropriate penalty is lost. Without the mitigating 
evidence, the defendant forces the judicial system to equate the 
culpability of the panicky teenager to that of the recidivist execu-
tioner. The integrity of the criminal justice system in the non-
capricious imposition of the death penalty is subverted if a defendant 
can choose the penalty regardless of the merits. 
Arguments have been made that respect for the dignity of the 
individual justifies an exception to the non-arbitrary application of 
the death penalty and demands that the defendant be allowed to 
choose death over life imprisonment. 344 There appears to be a trend 
to allow individuals to choose death over life in noncriminal contexts 
such as where the individual wishes to forego life-saving medical 
treatment.345 Moreover, the Supreme Court has permitted capital 
defendants to forego further appeals urged by third parties.346 
Despite permitting an individual to choose death by foregoing 
further appeals in a capital case or by refusing medical treatment in 
a noncriminal context, the eighth amendment issue raised when no 
mitigating evidence is presented to the factfinder at trial cannot be 
resolved as easily. It is true that the eighth amendment ban on cruel 
and unusual punishment in a criminal context is founded on the 
preservation of human dignity. 347 However, inherent in the concept 
of human dignity is an assurance that a penalty is not imposed which 
offends the dignity and integrity of society.348 The eighth amendment 
343. See supra text accompanying notes 52-60. 
344. See People v. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d 353, 370, 710 P.2d 925, 936, 222 Cal. 
Rptr. 13, 25 (1985) (Lucas, J., dissenting). 
345. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 179 Cal. 
App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986) (right of individual to discontinue feeding 
by nasogastric tube recognized). 
346. See supra discussion of cases in text accompanying notes 100-14. 
347. See Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2600 (1986). 
348. See supra note 45. Justice Marshall recently stated in the context of 
prohibiting the execution of the insane: ''Whether its aim be to protect the con-
demned from fear and pain without comfort of understanding, or to protect the 
dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance, the 
restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth Amendment." Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2602. 
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represents a societal interest above and beyond that of the individ-
ual.J49 The same issue does not exist in noncriminal contexts where 
the judicial system is not forcing the individual into the situation of 
choosing life or death.350 The defendant's free will in a criminal 
capital case is honored if there is no requirement that the defendant's 
attorney present mitigating evidence in contravention of the defen-
dant's wishes. The defendant thus chooses to take a position person-
ally favoring death over life. However, the eighth amendment requires 
that society's interest in not imposing cruel and unusual punishments 
also be protected.351 This can only be met by presenting mitigating 
evidence to the factfinder. 
The defense attorney is not the appropriate vehicle for introducing 
mitigating evidence when the defendant's position is acquiescence in 
death. Neither professional ethics standards nor the sixth amendment 
can tolerate such a split of the attorney's loyalties. The concern is 
real. In Judy v. State, 352 for example, the attorneys appointed to 
pursue the appeal against the defendant's wishes notified the court 
that they were confronted with conflicting duties. 353 The attorneys 
asked the court to resolve the "'insoluble professional and ethical 
problem"' they faced. 354 Another example is People v. Deere.355 The 
California Supreme Court held that the defense attorney had an 
ethical obligation as an "officer of the court" to present mitigating 
evidence.356 On remand the defense attorney again refused to present 
mitigating evidence. The trial court ultimately appointed both an 
investigator and another attorney to "assist" the defense attorney. 357 
349. Justice Marshall recognized this in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 
345-46 (1972) (Marshall, J. concurring). In the course of discussing whether the 
death penalty serves the purpose of retribution, Justice Marshall addressed the 
position that life imprisonment is more severe than death. He rejected this view and 
added: "But, whether or not they should be able to choose death as an alternative 
is a far different question from that presented here-i.e., whether the State can 
impose death as a punishment." /d. at 345-46 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
350. For a discussion of the balancing of governmental and individual interests 
in each context see Strafer, Volunteering for Execution: Competancy, Voluntariness 
and the Propriety of Third Party Intervention, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 860, 
895-908 ( 1983). 
351. The Court has recognized that both substantive and procedural guarantees 
stem from the eighth amendment. See Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct 2595, 2600 
(1986). 
352. 275 Ind. 145, 416 N.E.2d 95 (1981). 
353. /d., 416 N.E.2d at 97. 
354. /d. 
355. 41 Cal. 3d 353, 710 P.2d 925, 222 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1985). 
356. See supra text accompanying notes 221-29. 
357. See People v. Deere, No. ICR-7552 (Cal. filed May 14, 1986 and June 
27, 1986) (orders appointing attorney and investigator because of counsel's continuing 
refusal to present mitigating evidence). 
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Whether reported in the cases or not, the attorneys in these cases 
are placed in a difficult ethical situation.358 
The defense attorney is an advocate and an advisor only; the 
defendant must choose the goals and objectives of the litigation. The 
decision to seek life or death is a fundamental decision in a capital 
case. Although an attorney makes strategic decisions in litigation, 
the questions of the objectives of the litigation are the client's to 
make. 359 To say that the decision to live or die is a strategic decision 
is a difficult stretch of the term. The professional conduct codes 
provide for few curbs on the client's choices. The ethical standards 
permit limiting the objectives where the client consents, the objective 
is criminal or fraudulent activity, or the goal cannot be ethically or 
legally pursued by the lawyer. 360 The legitimacy of accepting the death 
penalty is apparent from the Supreme Court's decisions permitting 
defendants to forego further appeals or other efforts on their be-
half. 361 Whether or not to call specific witnesses to further this goal 
may be a tactical decision , but to introduce evidence supportive of 
life imprisonment when the defendant's objective is death is not a 
tactical decision. Mitigation evidence is in direct abrogation of the 
defendant's objective in the case. The fact that nonlegal, moral issues 
are part of the defendant's choice cannot sanction preemption of 
what is the defendant's decision. The rules of professional conduct 
358. The opposite moral dilemma exists for individual defense attorneys as 
well. See Massie v. Summer, 624 F.2d 72, 73 (9th Cir. 1980), where the Federal 
Public Defender was appointed to represent Massie, but asked leave to withdraw 
on the ground that he could not ethically present Massie's arguments to forego 
California's automatic review of a death sentence. As a former criminal defense 
attorney, the author knows that most defense lawyers could not advocate death for 
a human being. Assuming that the attorney was unable to dissuade the defendant 
from pursuing death, most would probably opt to let the defendant speak on his 
or her own behalf. Deere, for example, made a statement himself to the court 
asking for death. People v. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d 357, 710 P.2d 926, 222 Cal. Rptr. 
13, 17 (1985). To either require or permit the defense lawyer to act against the 
defendant's wishes, however, by presenting unwanted mitigating evidence would 
undermine the development at the beginning of the case of the trusting relationship 
necessary to the overall defense of the client. Although the need for such a 
relationship at the time of the penalty hearing would seem to be minimal compared 
to saving the defendant's life, the defendant's knowledge at the outset of the 
relationship that the defense attorney will act contrary to a significant decision the 
defendant has made or may make will seriously threaten the development of any 
trust between attorney and client. Consequently, despite the difficult moral situation 
of the defense lawyer, the underpinnings of the adversary system of justice are 
eroded if the defense attorney becomes an advocate against the client's position. 
The appointment of an independent attorney to present mitigating evidence alleviates 
this problem. 
359. See supra text accompanying notes 261-67. 
360. See supra text accompanying notes 269-72. 
361. See supra text accompanying notes 100-14. 
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specifically provide for the attorney's advice to include relevant 
nonlegal factors .362 
To impose an obligation on the attorney to contradict the wishes 
of the defendant raises other ethical problems as well. The unques-
tioned loyalty of the attorney to the client, recognized as the bulwark 
of the adversary system by the Supreme Court,363 would be lost. The 
attorney also faces a conflict of interest in representing the defen-
dant's interest and the court-required interest of the public. There 
further is a problem in revealing the confidences of the client if the 
attorney uses information gained from discussions with the defendant 
to find and introduce mitigating evidence. The defendant who wants 
to die is unlikely to forego this confidentiality to permit evidence to 
be introduced that he or she opposes. 
It is also not appropriate to impose on the attorney-client rela-
tionship the mask of "officer of the court." That term refers to a 
regulatory process by the courts. Attorneys are, and should be, held 
to the highest of standards regarding their conduct and it is appro-
priate that the judicial branch police attorneys. However, requiring 
an attorney to present evidence in abrogation of a client's chosen 
position denigrates the adversary system. Defendants will not trust 
an attorney who advises them that, although the attorney is an 
advocate for the defendant, he or she intends to present evidence 
contravening the defendant's wishes. The impact on the openness 
and trust necessary to an attorney-client relationship will be devas-
tating. 
Regardless of the ethical concerns, is there constitutionally in-
adequate representation of an accused when the defense attorney 
fails to present mitigating evidence? Although the constitutional 
guarantee could conceivably be inconsistent with professional ethical 
standards,364 effective assistance of counsel is based on assisting the 
defendant in presenting a position chosen by the defendant. Ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel arises when the attorney inadequately 
furthers the defendant's objectives, not when the attorney fails to 
act in opposition to those interests. Although the Supreme Court has 
indicated that the purpose of effective assistance of counsel is to 
ensure the fairness of the trial, 365 which certainly is infringed when 
no mitigating evidence is considered, it does not follow that counsel 
is necessarily ineffective every time a trial is unfair. A proceeding 
may be fundamentally unfair for reasons that have nothing to do 
with the attorney's performance. The fundamental unfairness is the 
362. See supra text accompanying note 267. 
363. See supra text accompanyng notes 329-31. 
364. See supra text accompanying note 326. 
365. See supra text accompanying notes 317-19. 
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result of an eighth amendment, or possibly a due process, issue, not 
the conduct of the defense attorney. 
The responses of the courts facing the issue of a defendant who 
wants to forego mitigating evidence have been inadequate. The 
Nevada and Louisiana courts reached the disturbing conclusion that 
a defendant could trigger the death penalty whether or not it was 
appropriate in that case. 366 Although the Fifth Circuit and Missouri 
courts appropriately found no ineffective assistance of counsel in 
failing to present mitigating evidence against the defendant's wishes, 
they failed to reach or resolve the eighth amendment issue of arbitrary 
imposition of the death penalty when there is no consideration of 
mitigating evidence. 367 The California court properly found that mit-
igating evidence must be presented to the factfinder, but floundered 
on the appropriate vehicle. 368 In finding the defense attorney to be 
the appropriate vehicle, the court had to strain both constitutional 
and ethical concepts.369 Constitutionally, the California court had to 
find ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to act against the 
objectives of the defendant. In order to resolve the ethical problem 
of not giv.ing complete loyalty to the defendant, the court was 
compelled to give a questionable interpretation to the "officer of the 
court" concept.370 The New Jersey court authorized the defense 
attorney to present mitigating evidence against his client's wishes, 371 
but has not yet faced the situation in which the defense counsel 
refuses to act against his client's position. 
The confusion is apparent in cases involving the waiver of state 
appellate review as well. Most hold that a statutorily required review 
cannot be waived, 372 which appears on its face to be a sound safeguard 
for the nonarbitrary imposition of the death penalty. Certainly the 
balancing of the public's interest in a just penalty with the individual 
defendant's control of his defense373 is an appropriate analysis. And 
yet, Nevada and Louisiana, while permitting no waiver of the ap-
peal, 374 maintain the inconsistent position that mitigating evidence 
need not be presented in the penalty phase at trial. 375 The mandatory 
366. See supra text accompanying notes 140-65. 
367. See supra text accompanying notes 166-94. 
368. See supra notes 197-233 and accompanying text. 
369. See supra notes 224-29 and accompanying text. 
370. See supra text accompanying notes 223-29. 
371. See supra text accompanying notes 234-42. 
372. See supra text accompanying notes 120-32. 
373. See supra text accompanying notes 126-32. 
374. Cole v. State, 101 Nev. 585, 589, 707 P.2d 545, 548 (1985); State v. 
Felde, 422 So. 2d, 370, 395 (La. 1982). 
375. The Indiana court similarly gave implicit approval to a death sentence 
where no mitigating evidence was presented or argument made at the defendant' s 
request in the course of conducting a mandatory review. Judy v. State, 275 Ind. 
145, 416 N.E.2d 95, 109-10 (1981). Cf Vandiver v. State, 480 N.E.2d 910 (Ind. 
1985) (penalty phase evidence presented only by state). 
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review is virtually meaningless when it is based on a record containing 
evidence only of aggravating factors .376 The California and New 
Jersey courts recognized and relied on this inconsistency. 377 Part of 
the basis for ordering the consideration of mitigating evidence in 
those states against the defendant's chosen course was to assure a 
meaningful appellate review. 
The inconsistent responses of the courts initially addressing the 
issue are not surprising. The scope of both the sixth and eighth 
amendments is an unsettled issue; their interpretation is a constant 
topic in the Supreme Court. Moreover, the practical problem of who 
should present the mitigating evidence will necessitate innovations in 
the usual adversary system. 
The best accommodation of interests would be achieved by ap-
pointing an attorney whose specific role is to present mitigating 
evidence. Other possibilities include the defense attorney, the court, 
or the prosecutor. The appointment of an independent attorney would 
avoid the conflicts in loyalties and roles inherent in requiring the 
defendant's attorney to present evidence counter to the defendant's 
position. It would further preserve the roles of the other players in 
the courtroom. 
If the court proceeded to call witnesses on its own to present 
mitigating evidence, two problems arise. The first is that the ap-
pearance of impartiality is lost; the jurors would inevitably be influ-
enced by the fact that the judge called the witnesses . However, 
perhaps an even greater problem would be how the court would 
fulfill the investigative function of discovering the witnesses, inter-
viewing them, and preparing their testimony. 
It is arguable that the prosecutor, who is obligated to seek justice, 
should present both mitigating and aggravating circumstances.378 
However, despite the laudatory aspirations of securing justice, a 
prosecutor must function as an advocate in a criminal trial. The 
prosecutor's role, after a determination that the death penalty is 
appropriately sought in a case, is to advocate that penalty to the 
fact finder. If a prosecutor were obligated to present mitigating as 
well as aggravating evidence, the system would falter. Either the 
adversary system would lose a necessary advocate where the prose-
376. This is recognized easily in cases where the defendant does not wish to 
die. For example, the Louisiana court remanded a case for a determination of 
whether counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence or to argue 
on defendant's behalf in the penalty phase. State v. Fuller, 454 So. 2d 119, 125 
(La. 1984). There is no indication that Fuller requested that his attorney forego the 
evidence or argument as in Felde. The Louisiana court's concern was the adequacy 
of its appellate review of the sentence for excessiveness. !d. at 124. 
377. See supra text accompanying notes 219-20 and 241-42. 
378. This procedure was used in State v. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d 409, 42 Crim. 
L. Rep. 2003 (Mo. 1987). 
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cutor presented evidence without taking a position on that evidence 
or the presentation by a prosecutor actively advocating the death 
penalty would vitiate the importance of the mitigating evidence. An 
investigative problem exists as well. Witnesses willing to testify in 
favor of the defendant's life are unlikely to trust the state's advocate. 
Thus, the most rational solution is to appoint an attorney whose sole 
role is to present mitigating evidence concerning the defendant to 
enable the factfinder to assess the balance of aggravating and miti-
gating factors. 
The courts, as a practical matter, appoint attorneys to assist the 
court in meeting eighth amendment concerns. This was ultimately 
the course taken by the California trial court in People v. Deere, as 
mentioned earlier. 379 Similarly, in Cole v. Statlfl80 the trial-level three-
judge panel appointed an "amicus" attorney to present mitigating 
evidence. The defendant represented himself with standby counsel 
available. 381 Attorneys appointed to present the defendant's case on 
a mandatory appeal, where the defendant wants to forego the appeal, 
are also serving the public's interest at the behest of the court. In a 
case upholding mandatory state appellate review of a death sentence 
against the defendant's wishes, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
in Massie v. Sumner382 noted that the California Supreme Court had 
appointed the State Public Defender to represent Massie. The court 
further stated that the defendant's right to self-representation was 
"limited and a court may appoint counsel over an accused's objection 
in order to protect the public interest in fairness and integrity of the 
proceedings. " 383 Cole is also an example of a court appointing an 
attorney to present an appeal on "behalf" of a defendant. 384 In 
reality, these courts were preserving society's interest in the integrity 
of the criminal justice system by appointing counsel, not furthering 
the defendant's interests. Appointing attorneys to present evidence 
or prepare and argue a case is, thus, not an unknown or difficult 
solution to the problem of presenting mitigating evidence. 
How should this procedure work? There are investigative and 
courtroom logistics to orchestrate. The investigative function often 
involves a substantial amount of time. Consequently, at the point 
where the defendant or his attorney first indicate the defendant's 
position will be to present no mitigating evidence, the court should 
appoint an attorney to begin investigation of possible witnesses and 
379. See supra text accompanying note 357. 
380. 101 Nev. 585, 707 P.2d 545 (1985). 
381. !d., 707 P.2d at 546. 
382. 624 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1980). 
383. !d. at 74. 
384. Cole v. State, 101 Nev. 585, 597, 707 P.2d 545 (1985) (counsel appointed 
to address issue of validity of waiver of appellate review). 
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other evidence in favor of mitigation. If the attorney believes that an 
investigator is needed to assist in discovering witnesses or other evi-
dence, this should be authorized as soon as it is requested. The 
appointments should be at state expense. Although obvious concerns 
with cost can be raised, the expense is likely to be minimal compared 
to the cost already involved in capital cases due to the need for 
extensive preparation, investigation, lengthy trials, and multiple ap-
peals, generally all borne by the state for an indigent defendant. If a 
state has chosen to impose a death penalty, it cannot shrink from the 
cost at the expense of constitutional guarantees. Some defendants may 
cooperate with the court-appointed attorney; others will not. The court-
appointed attorney should have access to any information regarding 
the defendant and location of family in the possession of the state. 
A record should be made of the avenues pursued. 
The courtroom procedure should include a presentation of the 
evidence in an adversary style. The court-appointed attorney should 
call the witnesses and conduct direct examination. The prosecution, 
as well as the defense, should have an opportunity to cross-examine 
the witnesses. The jury should be instructed as usual to consider 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In addition , the jury should 
be instructed to make their decision on the basis of the evidence; that 
the death penalty cannot be imposed without the consideration and 
appropriate determination of whether aggravation outweighs mitiga-
tion, regardless of the defendant's position. The court-appointed at-
torney should also be permitted to argue the case to the jury along 
with the prosecution and the defense. 
Although the appointment of an attorney to present mitigating 
evidence is an unusual step, it accommodates the need for the evidence 
and the preservation of an adversary proceeding. The defense attorney 
is not asked to compromise loyalties and the state is not asked to 
compromise its position or advocacy. The court is not asked to assume 
a partial role. Protection against an arbitrary punishment is achieved 
by the consideration of both aggravating and mitigating evidence. 
Thus, society's interest in punishments proportional to culpability is 
protected in the context of an adversary proceeding. 
VI. CoNCLUSION 
The heart of the problem when a defendant in a capital case 
refuses to present mitigating evidence is ensuring the non-arbitrary 
imposition of death. Because the penalty of death is so absolute, the 
reliability of the decision becomes a paramount issue. The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly emphasized the need to consider mitigating, as 
well as aggravating, factors to assure a non-arbitrary imposition of 
the penalty.385 If an individual defendant is allowed to demand death 
385. See supra text accompanying notes 50-60. 
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without a consideration of mitigating factors, that assurance is lost. 
Society's interest in the dignity of the system, as reflected in the eighth 
amendment's inherent prohibition against arbitrary punishments, is 
abrogated . To the extent that society continues to consider death a 
valid punishment, the appointment of an attorney to present mitigating 
evidence when a defendant refuses to do so is a step towards preserving 
the integrity of the criminal justice system. 
